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A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: SEC v. Ripple
Labs as an Inflection Point in the Regulatory
Approach to Innovation in Complex Systems
ABSTRACT
This Comment makes both an observation and an argument about the
SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc. litigation. First, this Comment observes that the
facts of the case constitute a challenge to the lack of clarity surrounding the
current regulatory regime governing blockchains and initial coin offerings
(ICOs). Second, this Comment argues that the Ripple case provides regulators an opportunity to, if they choose, use complexity theory to address
technological innovation—such as blockchain—as an emergent phenomenon in a complex system rather than as a binary policy choice to be either
encouraged or discouraged.
Ripple, the U.S. company behind one of the world’s largest crypto assets by capitalization, deployed a blockchain network designed to remove
the traditional friction points of intermediation and settlement from money
transfer systems. To obtain widespread adoption of its crypto asset, XRP,
both Ripple and its executives sold XRP to speculators and professional investors, but more than five years later—and following a rash of enforcement
actions against other blockchain companies—the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought Ripple and its executives into federal
court for allegedly violating U.S. securities laws. The lawsuit is unique
because it was not only brought against the company and personnel behind
one of the most successful iterations of a novel technology, but effectively,
it was brought against a widely held cryptocurrency at a time when pandemic-driven economic and social pressure and billions of dollars in
main-street investment in new blockchain technologies was occurring in the
wider U.S. economy.
But as important as the result of the case is, this Comment suggests
that the long view of the case’s impact should be understood through the
lens of complexity theory: regulators should, in cases of innovative technology, use this discipline to see the case as both an emergent phenomenon
and a point in the trajectory of the larger U.S. economy where innovation
and consumer protection are not binary, opposed considerations. To flesh
this out, this Comment offers a broad, high-level overview informed by complexity science of the basic operation and recent history of blockchain
335
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technology and ICOs as well as the economic forces at work in the U.S. and
an explanation of Ripple’s use case. This Comment then will turn to the
regulatory history between the SEC and Ripple and analyze the merits of
the investment contract approach necessary for SEC jurisdiction. Understanding the history, the parties, and the litigation as parts of a complex
system, this Comment concludes by listing several expert suggestions regarding blockchain technologies consistent with obtaining short term stability that the court can take up in dealing with the facts of the case in the
light of existing precedent.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly obscured by the architectural mélange that composes the Federal Triangle is a statue of a man of impossible proportions attempting to
control an equally outsized horse. The intended message of the statue becomes obvious either by recognizing where one is when one sees it—outside the Federal Trade Commission building—or by simply knowing the
statue’s name: “Man Controlling Trade.”1
With its exaggerated proportions and sense of motion—hallmarks of
the Art Deco period—the statue vividly and confidently illustrates the struggle between the undulations of the market and the restraining hand of the
government.2 The statue suggests that upon sufficient exertions of strength
and concentration, the market may perhaps be tamed;3 it also reminds the
observer that the struggle to control is not a new phenomenon,4 and that
everyone, regulators5 and artists6 included, must grapple with exogenous
1. Man Controlling Trade (Model, Federal Trade Commission Building),
SMITHSONIAN AM. ART MUSEUM, https://americanart.si.edu/artwork/man-controlling-trademodel-federal-trade-commission-building-14289 [https://perma.cc/62W7-HAEB]. This
statue was sculpted by a New York artist named Michael Lantz for the Federal Trade Commission Building in 1942. Id.
2. See Chris Hoofnagle, Sidebar: On Man Controlling Trade (Aug. 12, 2014),
https://hoofnagle.berkeley.edu/2014/08/12/sidebar-man-controlling-trade/ [https://perma.cc
/N7KZ-VTGM] (“The muscular man stripped to the waist standing beside the horse and
gripping its reins symbolizes the federal government, which through intelligence and restraint forces the horse to submit its power to a useful purpose.”)
3. Today’s rendition of the theme of unconquerable forces underlies much many of the
superhero movies of recent interest. See, e.g., AVENGERS: INFINITY WAR (Marvel Studios
2018); AVENGERS: ENDGAME (Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures 2019).
4. See Deuteronomy 12:1–26:19 (outlining the Deuteronomic Code as told by Moses
to the Israelites). Some well-known examples are the ancient tales of the Greeks in which
gods and heroes vie for supremacy against one another. See generally THOMAS BULFINCH,
The Age of Fable, in THE COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY, 196, 200–
10 (1998 ed.) (detailing the account given by Homer in The Iliad).
5. For example, in the SEC’s 2022 Congressional Budgetary request, the SEC asked
for $1.99 billion dollars to “effectively carry out its mission and make a meaningful difference in meeting the challenges of today’s global, interconnected, and technologically-sophisticated markets.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2022 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 2–3 (2021).
6. To stick with the movie example, new technologies are often created in response to
unmet needs in visual effects production. Much of the Avengers films’ success, for example,
was the result of filmmakers’ innovative computer-generated graphics techniques that
brought a mid-twentieth century comic book to life. See Chris McGowan, How the Avengers
Movies Impacted, & United, the World of Visual Effects, VFX VOICE, (Dec. 10, 2019), https:
//www.vfxvoice.com/how-the-avengers-movies-impacted-and-united-the-world-of-visualeffects/ [https://perma.cc/G6SP-BCB4].
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forces of innovation. But the breadth and scale of data describing today’s
marketplace urges reconsideration of the analogy proffered by the statue:
whatever a “successful” interaction between innovation and regulator may
be, defining that interaction in easily understandable reductionist rules may
be inadequate because the interaction it seeks to control is, if anything, more
complex and nonlinear than ever before.
Today’s private sector technology firms have successfully developed
blockchain technologies including ICOs,7 distributed finance systems, cryptocurrencies and crypto assets,8 autonomous organizations and processes,
and others, such that their sheer ubiquity has forced the highest levels of
government to face these technologies on their own terms.9 That is to say,
not only as networks, but also as tools of alternate governance of human
relationships.10 Because blockchains generally operate on a limited-trust
basis,11 and because their adoption is driven by the demand for private law12
outside of the control of a single entity or institution,13 the very operation
7. Jake Frankenfield, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp [https://perma.cc/59TY6ZMA]. An ICO is an “equivalent to an initial public offering” that is done by a cryptocurrency firm, where investors “buy into [the] offering to receive a new cryptocurrency token
issued by the company.” Id.
8. Crypto-assets are digital representations of value that exist on a blockchain, often
called “tokens,” and they “rest[] on three established foundations: cryptography, digital cash,
and distributed systems.” KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE
OF TRUST 40 (2018). However, the neutral term “crypto-assets” does not denote whether the
asset under discussion is in fact a legal currency. See also Justin Henning, Note, The Howey
Test: Are Crypto-Assets Investment Contracts?, 27 U. Mia. Bus. L. Rev. 51, 53 (2018).
Throughout this Comment, when a token or asset is under general discussion, the terms “asset” and “currency” may be used interchangeably.
9. Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets, Exec. Order No. 14067, 87
Fed. Reg. 14143, 14143 (Mar. 9, 2022).
10. Vili Lehdonvirta, The Blockchain Paradox: Why Distributed Ledger Technologies
May Do Little to Transform the Economy, OXFORD INTERNET INST. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news-events/news/the-blockchain-paradox-why-distributed-ledge
r-technologies-may-do-little-to-transform-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/UZF8-G5WT]
(“Who makes the rules matters at least as much as who enforces them. Blockchain technology may provide for completely impartial rule-enforcement, but that is of little comfort if
the rules themselves are changed.”).
11. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 29.
12. See GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED
LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 91 (2016) (arguing that
regulations are driven by economic forces) (“A large part of what has driven the development
of the legal structures we take for granted is the economic demand for law. Even the basic
interest in fairness in law is in significant measure an economic demand.” (emphasis added)).
13. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 30.
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and purpose of blockchains is generally counterintuitive to traditional regulatory structures. In one sense, this is a “governance paradox,” because
the idea that no person controls the blockchain is—at least partially—an
illusion.14 The implications of blockchain as a tool for managing “trustless”
relationships is not fully understood, and how the technology is to be guided
is not obvious. It is not clear that self-contained computer code that automatically executes a contract is to be enforced by exterior actors rather than
by code,15 nor is it “metaphysical[ly]” obvious that the direct sale of a digital
asset that purports to allow participation in a network should or should not
be considered a security, or anything else, for that matter.16 Regulatory involvement and intervention is required,17 for example, to address issues
such as the use of crypto assets to circumvent the law, determination of the
way in which existing legal structures are to recognize distributed ledgers,
and how the use of blockchains in already recognized transactions are to
operate.18 These and other tensions simmer below the case SEC v. Ripple
Labs, Inc. (Ripple Litigation or the Litigation).19
This Comment observes, often using historical comparisons, that the
Ripple Litigation is an important case for courts, Congress, and the U.S.
regulatory apparatus generally, because it shows that the shoehorn approach
taken by regulators today is likely unworkable in cases where, like here, the
law is dangerously close to being tone-deaf not only to the technology and
14. Id. at 133–35.
15. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 214.
16. Laura Shin, Are ICOs for Utility Tokens Selling Securities? Prominent Crypto Players Say Yes, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/
10/02/are-icos-for-utility-tokens-selling-securities-prominent-crypto-players-say-yes/?sh=3
a16b68334fa [https://perma.cc/9XA6-VYZ6] (“There is no existential metaphysical continuum where [a] pdf file become [sic] an entry on a decentralized ledger.”); see also JUAN
BATIZ-BENET ET AL., PROTOCOL LABS & COOLEY, THE SAFT FRAMEWORK: TOWARD A
COMPLIANT TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 3 (2017) (“[Utility tokens] offer intrinsic utility that
powers a decentralized, distributed network that delivers to the users of the network a consumptive good or service.”).
17. See Cathy Mulligan, Blockchain and Sustainable Growth, U.N. CHRON.,
https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/blockchain-and-sustainable-growth [https://perma.cc/S
TJ7-5FGT].
18. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 178–81. Also important is the need for continued
maintenance of the United States’ strategic position in a shrinking global economy. See
Rosie Rios (@RosieRios), TWITTER (Sept. 26, 2021, 3:35 PM), https://twitter.com/RosieRio
s/status/1442211127123845127 [https://perma.cc/DHN3-3VG5] (“XRP’s primary purpose
is facilitating cross border payments while other [crypto assets] find their value in speculation. China’s latest move brings this point home.”).
19. Complaint, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20 Civ. 10832, 2021 WL 1814771
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Ripple Labs Complaint].
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to the facts, but to the promotion of resiliency of the complex system that
gave rise to both. The Comment’s argument lies here. Therefore, it is predictable that this case will, in one way or another, tend towards a system
trajectory of short-term stability by advancing the law’s treatment of blockchain and crypto assets by either (1) spurring the courts to develop a new
“Ripple test,” or otherwise limiting existing caselaw,20 (2) spurring Congress to action, or (3) providing clarity on treatment of crypto assets like
XRP even if a settlement occurs. Part II discusses the circumstances at play
behind the lawsuit as well as introducing the main players. Part III provides
a basic discussion of the salient mechanics of blockchain and crypto assets
as they exist in a broader context, turning then to Ripple as a contextualized
use case. With this foundation laid, Part IV describes the approach taken
by the judiciary to enable the SEC to regulate companies like Ripple. Part
V completes this discussion and further contextualizes it by undertaking a
brief analysis of the posture of the case. With all of this in hand, Part VI
claims that in any of the three most likely outcomes, this case should be
important not only to the future of blockchain innovation in the U.S., but
also to regulators who are willing to consider it as an example of that emergent phenomenon and consider it and its underlying causes as an irreducible
part of the U.S. economy.
I. BACKGROUND
After a failed attempt to settle on December 22, 2020—the last day in
office for Chairman Jay Clayton—the SEC filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Ripple21
and two of its executives for alleged violations of the U.S. Securities Act of

20. Particularly, it is possible that the Howey framework and its progeny may generate
a re-definition of an “investment contract.” This is hardly a novel claim. See generally
Henning, supra note 8, at 73 (“The heavy uncertainty around crypto-assets seems to suggest
we are heading towards some sort of clarity.”).
21. See also What is Ripple? A Beginner’s Guide for Understanding Ripple,
COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointelegraph.com/blockchain-for-beginners/what-is-ripple-a-beginners-guide-for-understanding-ripple [https://perma.cc/AR6Z-NDKR] [hereinafter What
is Ripple?]; Kevin Reynolds, SEC Chairman Clayton Says Wednesday Is His Last Day in
Office, COINDESK (Sept. 14, 2021, 6:47 AM) https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2020/12/23
/sec-chairman-clayton-says-wednesday-is-his-last-day-in-office/ [https://perma.cc/X5ZWTZT9].

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss2/5

6

Smith-Bishop: A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: <em>SEC v. Ripple Labs</em> as an Inf

2022]

A RIPPLE-TURNED-TIDAL WAVE

341

1933,22 and as to the executives, for aiding and abetting such violations.23
The SEC alleged that Ripple and the executives participated in, and still
participate in, an unregistered securities offering for the sale of XRP, Ripple’s native crypto asset, beginning in 2013.24 The filing was unusual25—
Clayton was one of the three-commissioner majority voting to bring the
lawsuit, and he did so only “hours before resigning.”26 Also unusual,
though not unforeseen, was the effect of the enforcement action: in the
twenty-four-hour period following the lawsuit’s filing, approximately fifty
billion dollars was obliterated as XRP’s value tumbled in the wake of the
report of the lawsuit.27 XRP was valued as the seventh-largest crypto currency by market capitalization at the time of the lawsuit.28 Much of the loss
was borne by main street investors who were unable to sell off their XRP
as it was de-listed from secondary cryptocurrency exchanges following the
declaration by the SEC that Ripple had engaged in illegal conduct.29
The Ripple Litigation is a snapshot of the current regulatory landscape
in the crypto asset space.30 By virtue of its assertion of jurisdiction, the SEC
has turned the threshold matter into a fact-intensive—and therefore
22. See Reynolds, supra note 21 (“Clayton certainly knows how to leave on a high note.
His last day comes 24 hours after the SEC filed suit against fintech firm Ripple . . . sending
shockwaves throughout the crypto[-asset] industry.”).
23. Ripple Labs Complaint, supra note 19 at 3.
24. Id. at 1–2.
25. And this may be putting it mildly. See Roslyn Layton, In the Ripple Case, the SEC
Is Now on Trial—and Knows It, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2021, 9:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/si
tes/roslynlayton/2021/04/08/in-the-ripple-case-the-sec-is-now-on-trial—and-knows-it/amp/
?__twitter_impression=true [https://perma.cc/8PJ6-DSSC] [hereinafter The SEC Is Now on
Trial]; see also Carol Goforth, It Is Time for the U.S. to Create a ‘Ripple Test’ for Crypto,
COINTELEGRAPH (July 21, 2021), https://cointelegraph.com/news/it-is-time-for-the-us-tocreate-a-ripple-test-for-crypto [https://perma.cc/V6YN-EYC4] [hereinafter Time for a Ripple Test].
26. Eleanor Terrett & Charlie Gasparino, Regulatory Riddle: An Investigation into the
SEC v. Ripple Case and its Consequences for Crypto, FOX BUS. (Nov. 24, 2021), https://ww
w.foxbusiness.com/features/sec-ripple-crypto-future-blockchain [https://perma.cc/59FX-9
CJ4].
27. Bilal Jafar, Jay Clayton’s Last Day at SEC Resulted in $50 Billion Cryptocurrency
Crash, FINANCE MAGNATES (Dec. 24, 2020, 7:26 AM), https://www.financemagnates.com
/cryptocurrency/news/jay-claytons-last-day-at-sec-resulted-in-50-billion-cryptocurrency-cr
ash/ [https://perma.cc/WNW3-3PB4].
28. All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/
[https://perma.cc/3WFH-MBVE] (listing XRP with a market capitalization of over more
than $51 billion dollars).
29. Terrett & Gasparino, supra note 26.
30. See generally WERBACH, supra note 8, at 177–200 (discussing the transition from
New York’s trail-blazing Bitlicense regulation to the current state of crypto regulation).
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expensive—analysis of the asset, or “token,” native to the blockchain network in issue to determine whether it is, or was offered as, a “security”
within the meaning of the law. Although the SEC concluded that Ripple
participated in a securities offering, the agency has also signaled that, at
least some cases, tokens sold during an ICO were securities at that time, but
not at others.31 At the very least, the facts in Ripple’s case—particularly the
SEC’s delay in bringing the action while knowing that during the delay
more sales and decentralization were taking place—seem to call for a clear
explanation for the basis of delineation.32
Recognizing this, both in the Litigation and in the court of public opinion, a key component of Ripple’s overarching strategy has been to highlight
the inconsistency of the SEC’s “decentralization” rationale.33 This has
largely been in response to public behavior by SEC officials; over several
years, former chairpersons of the SEC have pointed to both Ethereum and
Bitcoin,34 suggesting35 that sufficient decentralization of computing resources36 may defeat a “security” classification of a crypto asset because the
“purchasers [of the crypto asset] would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts[.]”37
As far as it goes, Ripple’s argument is probably consistent with the commonsense understanding of a general market participant, or “main street investor,” of what a security is: “[a] share of ownership in a company—giving
31. See, e.g., William Hinman, Dir. of Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Remarks at the Yahoo
Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto (June 14, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.sec
.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 [https://perma.cc/G57V-3C96]); Joseph Hall,
Ripple Token Case Highlights Need for SEC Clarity on Crypto, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2021, 4:56
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1346432 [https://perma.cc/L67L-35KB].
32. See Yuliya Guseva, The SEC, Digital Assets, and Game Theory, 46 J. CORP. L. 629,
649–50 (2021).
33. Terrett & Gasparino, supra note 26.
34. These are the two most well-known cryptocurrencies and the two largest cryptocurrencies by market capitalization. John Divine, Bitcoin v. Ethereum: Which Is a Better Buy?,
US NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 18, 2022 12:19 PM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/cry
ptocurrency/articles/bitcoin-vs-ethereum-which-is-a-better-buy [https://perma.cc/8PAR-49
XV].
35. Hinman, supra note 31.
36. Sufficient decentralization in a disintermediated system like blockchain means that
“it is the users themselves and their vast combined computing power that record[s] transactions directly between peers, rather than through banks[.]” Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s
Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients about Crypto-transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 47, 54 (2019).
37. Hinman, supra note 31; see also Neeraj Agrawal, SEC Chairman Clayton: Bitcoin
Is Not a Security, COIN CENTER (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.coincenter.org/sec-chairmanclayton-bitcoin-is-not-a-security/ [https://perma.cc/S5UD-S9J5].
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the shareholder a stake in the business and an interest in its profits.”38 It is
the efforts of the company’s board of directors or other management that is
the primary driving force behind changes in the value of the investment. In
the cases of the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains, widespread adoption of
a crypto asset has already occurred.39 Ripple strenuously argues that this
temporal distinction is the only meaningful difference between XRP and
these other two acknowledged non-security crypto assets.40 However persuasive this argument may be publicly, the legal question under the current
regulatory framework will boil down to whether the court understands the
facts of this case to show that the SEC’s or Ripple’s understanding of what
XRP is as a matter of classification is the correct one.
Like a large and increasing number of entrepreneurial-minded businesses,41 Ripple has used blockchain technology as part of a solution to a
longstanding problem: the inefficiencies in international finance. The firm
was successful in the five years leading up to the lawsuit: XRP was adopted
by some of the largest banks in the world as a payments rail,42 and, at the
38. J. Carl Cecere, Cryptocurrency’s Future in the U.S. Is Threatened by SEC Action
Against Ripple, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 19, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.co
m/securities-law/cryptocurrencys-future-in-the-u-s-is-threatened-by-sec-action-against-ripple [https://perma.cc/B3SR-Q5ZQ]. Of course, this definition does not legally control. See
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (alternatively cited as Securities Act §2(1)) (defining security).
39. See Carol Goforth, Cinderella’s Slipper: A Better Approach to Regulating Cryptoassets as Securities, 17 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 271, 285 (2021) [hereinafter Cinderella’s Slipper].
40. See, e.g., Chris Giancarlo & Conrad Bahlke, Cryptocurrencies and U.S. Securities
Laws: Beyond Bitcoin and Ether, IFLR (June 17, 2020), https://www.iflr.com/article/b1m2p
m9g4n65mk/cryptocurrencies-and-us-securities-laws-beyond-bitcoin-and-ether [https://per
ma.cc/5ER9-9FUA] (“The mere fact that an individual holds XRP does not create any relationship, rights or privileges with respect to Ripple any more than owning Ether would create
a contract with the Ethereum Foundation[.]”).
41. To give an idea of the size of blockchain, one research company suggests that blockchain is going to expand “from USD [$]4.9 billion in 2021 to USD [$]67.4 billion by 2026,
at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 68.4% during the forecast period.” Blockchain Market with COVID-19 Impact Analysis, by Component (Platforms and Services),
Provider (Application, Middleware, and Infrastructure), Type (Private, Public, and Hybrid),
Organization Size, Application Area, and Region-Global Forecast to 2026, MARKETS &
MARKETS, https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/blockchain-technologymarket-90100890.html [https://perma.cc/PD29-PKWA].
42. For a list of the financial institutions using RippleNet, see AWS Partner Profile:
Ripple, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/partners/success/ripple/ [https://perma.cc/T8W3SYCM]; see also Eric Grant, 6 Biggest Banks Using Ripple (XRP) Products,
USETHEBITCOIN, https://usethebitcoin.com/6-biggest-banks-using-ripple-products/ [https://
perma.cc/CQB9-DM4K]. But see Leo Jakobson, Citing SEC Suit MoneyGram Suspends
Use of Ripple ODL, MOD. CONSENSUS (Feb. 22, 2021), https://modernconsensus.com/
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time of the Litigation, Ripple was the third-largest crypto asset by capitalization in the U.S.43 Even after the lawsuit, the company has experienced
year-over-year growth with XRP use in international markets.44 Therefore,
Ripple is recognized as a tangible illustration of how the non-intermediated
trust of blockchain is expected to be a major player in social and business
problems in the coming years.45
And while businesses could simply not conduct ICOs—certainly the
distribution of crypto assets need not be in exchange for money or in anticipation of future money46—this is an understandably less attractive option
to for-profit businesses.47 Similarly understandable considering the uncertainty48 of new technologies is the SEC’s mandate to protect investors. But
in the Ripple Litigation, the facts urge careful consideration by the court of
the unique underlying regulatory challenges of crypto assets, namely, distinguishing between degrees of decentralization,49 properly classifying the
crypto assets, and consistent enforcement. While the judiciary has another
clear bite at the apple to make a clarifying change that could limit the SEC’s
long reach50—which as Ripple’s current international success suggests is in

cryptocurrencies/ripple/citing-sec-suit-moneygram-suspends-use-of-ripplenet/ [https://perm
a.cc/4T97-T46Y].
43. See Guseva, supra note 32, at 668.
44. See Craig DeWitt, ODL Sees Record Growth and Traction in 2021, RIPPLE INSIGHTS
(Oct. 29, 2021), https://ripple.com/insights/record-growth-and-traction-odl-in-2021/ [https:
//perma.cc/N9FA-KUGH].
45. For example, the metaverse, which is at the center of Web3, is expected to have
significant blockchain involvement as the foundation of its operation. See Joseph Raczynski,
The Metaverse is Coming: Is the Legal Market Prepared?, THOMSON REUTERS (Oct. 11,
2021), https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/legal/legal-metaverse/ [https://perma
.cc/R557-2Q3A] (suggesting that blockchain’s ability to transparently store data will drive
the expansion of the metaverse).
46. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 183.
47. And, it may not account for the potential of blockchains to democratize startups.
48. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 198–99.
49. See generally Ben Jessel, Can Hester Peirce’s Safe Harbor Proposal Save Cryptocurrency? Experts Weigh In, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/benjessel/2020/04/01/hester-peirces-safe-harbor-proposallegal-and-regulatory-expertsweigh-in-on-the-catch-22/#23d99d24665a [https://perma.cc/XL6E-X2JB] (“[A] token distribution (which is a necessary part of launching a public network) might be deemed by the
SEC to be a securities offering which would place significant restrictions around the ability
for tokens to be transferred without friction. These restrictions would place a barrier on a
network being able to achieve decentralization and adoption. A decentralized network with
no-adoption would in-turn likely mean that its native token would be classed as a security.”).
50. Ripple’s executives argue that these sales are outside of Congress’s jurisdiction. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Bradley Garlinghouse’s Motion to Dismiss

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss2/5

10

Smith-Bishop: A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: <em>SEC v. Ripple Labs</em> as an Inf

2022]

A RIPPLE-TURNED-TIDAL WAVE

345

the best economic and strategic interests of the U.S.51—a more complex
understanding of regulators and innovators is needed than that suggested by
Man Controlling Trade.
A. The U.S. Economy as a Complex System
Whether judicial or congressional, the legal decisions made in response to the Ripple Litigation and cases certain to follow it will be difficult.
To capture the complexity of the free-willed agents and institutions, decision-making will require a data-driven framework capable of modeling
these non-linear concepts.52 To see this, consider that the Ripple Litigation,
like the U.S. economy or society itself, obviously did not develop in a vacuum; it developed over time into a system exhibiting features of complexity53 that “emerg[e] from the actions and interactions of . . . actors in a networked relationship, but with different characteristics from
those . . . actors.”54 Complexity theory is the study of these “systems effects, . . . [meaning the] inter-agent connections and the system-wide effects they produce,”55 and it predicts that a system that experiences introduction of new conditions—such as the dynamic interaction between
individuals and institutions that compose it—will behave nonlinearly because that system is more than the aggregate sum of its parts.56 This is profound not only philosophically, but practically, because it suggests that understanding large systems full of simple rules take on a predictive life
separate from their inputs and composite parts.

the Amended Complaint at 20, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20 Civ. 10832, 2021 WL
1814771 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2021).
51. See DeWitt, supra note 44.
52. J.B. Ruhl advocates that the first step is “withdrawing from the reductionist-bred
molds that have predominated in American legal theory and institutions and have led to stasis
through over-regulation, so that we can begin to see dynamical behavior in the law-and-society system for what it is.” J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical
Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 927 (1996).
53. This Comment will not discuss complexity theory in detail. For a primer on the
subject, see MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2009).
54. Jamie Murray et al., Encountering Law’s Complexity, in COMPLEXITY THEORY AND
LAW: MAPPING AN EMERGENT JURISPRUDENCE 3, 6 (Jamie Murray et al. eds., 2019).
55. J.B. Ruhl & Daniel M. Katz, Mapping Law’s Complexity with “Legal Maps,” in
COMPLEXITY THEORY AND LAW: MAPPING AN EMERGENT JURISPRUDENCE 23, 26 (Jamie
Murray et al. eds., 2019).
56. MITCHELL, supra note 53, at 23 (referring to this idea using the term “sensitive dependence on initial conditions”).
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Analogizing a real complex system, like the U.S. economy and those
who compose it, to a model capable of prediction requires a cursory understanding of two concepts from the sub-discipline of dynamical systems theory57 and the roles they play in the system: the concepts of “trajectory” and
a system’s “attractors.”58 Simply put, a trajectory is a path a system takes
in an n dimensional space in which the system exists.59 An attractor is a
description of a system’s behavior that the attractor describes.60 These
terms are simply lexicon for describing interactions at scale. For example,
to predict how a flock of birds may behave, one may try to reduce the behavior of the flock into the behavior of each of the individual birds and extrapolate to the whole.61 However, this seemingly logical approach—informed by the commonsense notion that the flock behaves according to
simple rules such as follow the bird ahead, turn left when that bird turns left,
turn right when that bird turns right, and so on—cannot predict what the
flock as an emergent entity or as a “system” will do. This is precisely because the birds—which are “agents” in the system—interact with and affect
each other in a constant feedback loop. While one can say the flock will
respond to attractors, such as seeking food and avoiding predators, or that
the flock’s trajectory can be described as trending toward or away from
these attractors, prediction requires treating the flock as more than the sum
of its parts. It is for this reason that the rules governing each of the birds
are insufficient at scale to understand—much less control—the trajectory of
the emergent phenomenon. It is with this understanding that the Ripple Litigation should be considered: instead of focusing only on whether legal interpretations of a securities regime built for a different time are appropriate
for a new class of technology, regulators should consider identifying the
attractors and trajectory of the entire system of which the Ripple Litigation
is an emergent phenomenon and develop models that quantify attractors and
that measure and test possible regulation for effectiveness in charting a
course towards desirable system states and away from collapse.
Using traditional reductionist thinking, modeling is probably difficult
or even impossible. As a complex system, the U.S. economy is “always
evolving” and is “highly dependent” on persons and institutions involved

57. See Ruhl, supra note 52, at 862 n.19.
58. Id. at 862–63.
59. Id. at 863 n.22.
60. Id. at 863 n.24.
61. See id. at 893–916 (explaining the rise of, and ultimate failure of, reductionism in
American law to account for full prediction of what courts would do under a certain set of
facts).
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with it.62 Thus, complexity theory suggests that not only will this Litigation
probably have a nonlinear effect on everything from blockchain adoption to
consumer choice to use crypto currencies,63 but inasmuch as the Litigation
itself is a complex system composed of agents the background socio-economic situation will itself impart change within the Litigation as agents and
institutions are forced to respond personally and professionally. But society
still requires the law to “promote stability or resilience to systemic
threats.”64 And there are many such threats: the U.S. is faced with economic
and health-related woes from inflation and COVID-19, as well as challenges to the rule of law and the fair administration of justice in the light of
racial and social unrest. In terms of market growth, there is also the next
phase of the internet, known as Web3, which will largely be driven by underlying blockchain technology.65 These kinds of emergent phenomenon
may be the results of “strange attractors,” which have a unique role in a
complex system:66 the creation of difficult-to-predict outcomes, or “chaotic
system states.”67 The weather and its effects on agents within the system is
a concrete example.68 Accounting for and building systemic resiliency
against these states is part of the job of prudent regulation. Applying these
principles to ICOs, for example, which are often the preferred method of
gaining adoption for blockchain systems in verticals ranging from decentralized finance to “data validation, data access, and identity protection,”69
means recognizing that ICOs are emergent phenomena arising from the actions and reactions of agents as they respond to attractors and influence the
trajectory of the system as it is shaped by the harmful effects of the pandemic and other chaotic attractors.

62. Mark A. Chinen, Governing Complexity, in COMPLEXITY THEORY AND LAW:
MAPPING AN EMERGENT JURISPRUDENCE 151, 152 (Jamie Murray et al. eds., 2019).
63. See Ruhl, supra note 52, at 852–53.
64. Chinen, supra note 62, at 152.
65. Charles Silver, What is Web 3.0?, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.forb
es.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/01/06/what-is-web-3-0/?sh=3dbc756058df [https://per
ma.cc/C5E4-NMA8].
66. See Ruhl, supra note 52, at 864.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 865 n.31.
69. Statista Rsch. Dep’t, Worldwide Spending on Blockchain Solutions from 2017 to
2014, STATISTA (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/800426/worldwide-blo
ckchain-solutions-spending/ [https://perma.cc/PP4T-2YMG].
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Complexity theory counsels that management of ICOs requires considering the trajectory of the U.S. economy and the attractors describing it70
rather than solely focusing on the discrete rules of agent behavior. This
perspective, while admittedly still developing as a discipline, is likely a better view of the Ripple Litigation, and cases following it for regulators, because it avoids the reductionism of casting a regulator’s choices as binary,
consisting of either neutering regulator’s ability to deal with consumer
abuse and throttling innovation or allowing free reign to market forces and
self-interest at risk to consumers. Instead, complexity theory operates as a
broader conceptual tool for policymakers to understand, at scale, the systemic relationships inherent in agent behavior that considers, but is not reduced to, traditional metrics such as compliance costs and “inefficiencies
and uncertainties” of new business models.71 To illustrate the complexity
of blockchains in the U.S. economy, Figure 1 compares three sets of data
over the last eight years: the worldwide market capitalization of crypto assets in millions of dollars, the average yearly rate of inflation in the United
States as measured by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and the
number of SEC enforcement actions taken against blockchain-based firms
conducting ICOs. This dataset is admittedly limited temporally and inferentially;72 however, it is included here because the comparison suggests an
interesting correlation between inflation and cryptocurrency investment,
and the nonlinear, exponential growth that all three exhibit is a hallmark of
complex systems.73

70. See Ruhl, supra note 52, at 873 (“[M]anage[ment of] a particular manifestation of
human free will can be expressed as a point on a trajectory that meanders among the attractors of freedoms, rights, and regulations.”).
71. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 332.
72. This small dataset does not intend to prove—nor could it—whether the sudden and
substantial investment in blockchain technologies is anything more than a speculative bubble. A common criticism made by advocates of this position equates the investment in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin or speculative ICOs with what investors did with mortgage-backed
securities in the years prior to the Great Recession. C.f., WERBACH, supra note 8, at 6, 73–
74. But this is a straw man: speculative or even outright scam ICOs are a far cry from the
value-creating systems that leverage blockchain technologies, such as the supply chain management systems used by large corporations today or even Ripple itself. See, e.g., Statista
Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 69 (suggesting that in 2021, $6 billion dollars was spent on blockchain-related technology worldwide). And quite apart from legitimate questions about big
picture governance and regulation, blockchain has only begun to deliver on some of its promises of security and transparency and has been adopted largely for that reason.
73. See MITCHELL, supra note 53, at 33–35.
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Fig. 174

There are several forces at work that are shaping the trajectory of the
U.S. economy. The erosion of wealth caused by record inflation75 and
74. † Consumer Price Index, 1913–, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, https://www
.minneapolisfed.org/about-us/monetary-policy/inflation-calculator/consumer-price-index1913- [https://perma.cc/8599-KYAC].
†† Total Cryptocurrency Market Cap, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.co
m/charts/ [https://perma.cc/8P6A-32RJ].
††† Cyber Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., https://www.sec.gov
/spotlight/cybersecurity-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/9QPW-HE4K] (listing
around 150 actions taken against crypto-asset companies).
75. In Europe, inflation is at a ten-year high. See Annette Weisbach, ECB to Kick Off
its Tapering Debate as Inflation Surges to a 10-year High, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2021, 7:56 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/08/ecb-to-kick-off-its-tapering-debate-as-inflation-
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exacerbated by the pandemic76 has created a need for investments which
generate a return sufficient to beat the market, outpace the velocity of loss,
and effectively preserve spending power.77 Institutional investors traditionally accomplished this by “hedging” against inflation with real estate or
gold—now, they are turning to crypto assets.78 Particularly in the United
States, the pandemic triggered monetary policy over the five-month period
ending in September of 2021 that will have resulted in $2.7 trillion dollars
paid to U.S. citizens for COVID relief.79 From December 2020 to December 2021 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows a six percent increase in
inflation.80 As a matter of basic economics, the federal government’s desired outcome—indeed, the very purpose of the aid money—was to increase
consumer spending. But today’s spending has had a much different outcome than spending in the previous Great Recession in 2008. There, the
federal aid money given to banks was not accompanied by increased consumer lending, so inflation was not rampant, despite staggering sums of
money spent. Today, however, in addition to direct payments by the federal
surges.html [https://perma.cc/9HK3-9YGC]. See generally Ceyda Oner, Inflation: Prices
on the Rise, FIN. & DEV. MAG., May 31, 2018, at 30, 30 (“[I]nflation represents how much
more expensive the relevant set of goods and/or services has become over a certain period,
most commonly a year.”). There is concern that this record inflation will injure consumers
even further. See Gwynn Guilford, Broader Inflation Pressures Begin to Show, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 4, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/broader-inflation-pressures-begin-to
-show-11633339800 [https://perma.cc/GA94-L629]; see also Stephanie Landsman, Market
is Unprepared for the Inflation Fallout, Wharton’s Jeremy Siegel Warns, CNBC (Oct. 3,
2021 5:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/03/market-is-unprepared-for-inflation-fallo
ut-whartons-jeremy-siegel.html [https://perma.cc/L3MY-BYH7].
76. See Everyone Included: Social Impact of COVID-19, UNITED NATIONS: DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/everyone-included-covid19.html [https://perma.cc/57DU-HZKT].
77. See, e.g., Rajesh Cheruvu, How Inflation Will Impact Investing in Different Asset
Classes, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2021, 5:59 PM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/how-inflation-will-impact-investing-in-different-asset-classes/articleshow/85151244.cms?from=mdr [https://perma.cc/S3H7-X4TL].
78. Marco Quiroz-Gutierrez, Bitcoin—Not Gold—Is the New Inflation Hedge, Says
JPMorgan, FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2021, 2:16 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/10/08/bitcoin-notgold-is-the-new-inflation-hedge-says-jp-morgan/ [https://perma.cc/SW2Z-L65E].
79. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF MAJOR LAWS ENACTED IN
RESPONSE TO THE 2020–2021 CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC, DECEMBER 2020 AND MARCH 2021
1 (2021) (indicating that P.L. 116-260, enacted in December of 2020, increased the deficit
by $868 billion, and that P.L. 117-2, enacted in March of 2021, increased the deficit by $1.8
trillion dollars).
80. The Economics Daily Consumer Price Index: 2021 In Review, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STATS. (Jan 14, 2022) https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2022/consumer-price-index-2021-inreview.htm [https://perma.cc/4YD4-LEK5].
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government, U.S. banks are lending to consumers and therefore, consumer
spending is creating real inflation.81
Inflation by pandemic is hardly unprecedented. As long ago as 200
A.D.,82 a plague of what was probably smallpox decimated the Roman Empire during the reign of Diocletian.83 This “result[ed] [in] a drastic increase
on the prices of goods that had never before been witnessed in Rome[;] inflation was only one percent in the first two centuries AD, but prices doubled after the plague.”84 Although the exact cause of the inflation is believed by historians to be the loss of life—and the loss in productive labor
and a subsequent increase in wages85—rather than reactionary injection of
money into the economy, in both cases inflation has been ascribed to a
health crisis, and in both cases systemic weaknesses have been exposed.
Unlike the limited technological options available to the Roman Empire,
today systemic problems may present new use cases for blockchain, which
can function as a “regulatory modality in its own right.”86 Blockchain may
or may not be able provide a solution to some of the underlying social issues
involving access to modern healthcare; but if it could, that social benefit is
not generally considered under the current approach to regulation of blockchain startups.
Given these facts, it is no coincidence that crypto asset markets have
made recent, rapid advancements in the mainstream,87 and that technology

81. See, e.g., Steve Slifer, GDP, Inflation, and Interest Rate Forecasts, NUMBERNOMICS
(Jan. 28, 2022), https://numbernomics.com/forecasts/ [https://perma.cc/Q4RX-XWA5].
82. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 425 n.1 (Alfred
A. Knopf, 1993) (“The depreciation in the value of money or the rise in price of commodities
had been so great during the last century [from approximately 200–300 A.D.] that butcher’s
meat, which in the second century was two denarii a pound, was now fixed at a maximum
of eight”); see also Diocletian’s “Edict of Maximum Prices” Issued in 301 AD, ARMSTRONG
ECONOMICS, https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/research/monetary-history-of-the-worl
d/roman-empire/chronology_-by_-emperor/tetrachy/diocletian-284-305-ad/diocletiansedict-of-maximum-prices-issued-in-301-ad/ [https://perma.cc/X9ZD-EPWP].
83. What Role did Inflation Play in the Collapse of the Roman Empire,
DAILYHISTORY.ORG, https://dailyhistory.org/What_Role_Did_Inflation_Play_in_the_Colla
pse_of_the_Roman_Empire [https://perma.cc/N4HQ-JE95] (discussing how the Antonin
plague drastically increased the price of goods).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 153.
87. See, e.g., Benjamin Pimentel, Ripple’s Top Lawyer Says the SEC Has Declared War
on Crypto, PROTOCOL (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/fintech/ripple-sec-regulations-crypto-alderoty [https://perma.cc/DQ78-3P2L] (noting that Ripple’s general counsel
estimated the size of the crypto space as “over $3 trillion”).
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associated with the phenomenon has as well.88 In April of 2021, the largest
crypto exchange platform in the United States, Coinbase.com, was directly
listed on the NASDAQ.89 Exchanges like Coinbase increase the opportunity for late-moving investors to capture part of the substantial gains
which crypto assets offer.90 Indeed, crypto assets and the technology supporting them have reached an inflection point, with some estimates of the
total crypto capitalization. But blockchain as a vehicle for inflationary protection is only one possible use case. There are many other protective vehicles, including, but not limited to supply chain management, chain of custody applications, land titling, and occupational licensing. All are driven by
technological sophistication,91 social need, and market complexity.92
Although regulators “can[no]t ever reach absolute system predictability for a nonlinear dynamical system,” it is possible to manage the effects
of complexity through even-handed guidance.93 From a systemic perspective, the disruption to certain segments of the economy caused by innovation is the same whether it is driven by noble belief in progress or untrammeled greed. For example, in the nineteenth century, “[r]ailroads
transformed culture and the human perception of time and space” through
the infrastructure necessary for their operation.94 The creation of railroad
connections from town-to-town spurred innovation in timekeeping and
communication; at the same time, it enabled the graft and greed of the
88. Kevin Helms, SEC Chairman Says Satoshi Nakamoto’s Innovation Is Real, Crypto
Rules Are Clear, BITCOIN.COM (Aug. 8, 2021), https://news.bitcoin.com/sec-chairmansatoshi-nakamotos-innovation-real-crypto-rules-clear/ [https://perma.cc/6PQH-E3XS] (noting SEC Chairman Gary Gensler stated blockchain technology is worth “about $1.83 trillion”).
89. See Mark DeCambre, Coinbase IPO: Everything You Need to Know About the “Watershed Moment” in Crypto, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14, 2021, 3:50 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/coinbase-ipo-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-watershed-moment-in-crypto-11618350086 [https://perma.cc/35Y3-8C8X] (“[C]oinbase is a foundational
piece of the crypto ecosystem and is a barometer for the growing mainstream adoption of
bitcoin and crypto for the coming years[.]” (emphasis added)).
90. Throughout 2020 and 2021, cryptocurrency index returns have been substantial.
See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ET AL., THIRD ANNUAL GLOBAL CRYPTO HEDGE FUND
REPORT 2021, at 3 (2021) (“The median crypto hedge fund returned +128% in 2020 (vs +30%
in 2019).”).
91. At a certain level of technological sophistication, the pressure for market participants to cut costs becomes a paramount concern. See CHRISTOPHER LASCELLES, A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 167 (2019).
92. Mulligan, supra note 17.
93. Ruhl, supra note 52, at 861.
94. JACOB SOLL, THE RECKONING: FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RISE AND FALL
OF NATIONS 168 (2014).
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railroad operators.95 This certainly diluted the social benefits of the technology; at scale, the railroad magnates ensured that the very few became
wealthy at the expense of the many, largely through opaque financial reporting.96 Blockchain technology and, specifically, ICOs, are analogous to
both examples in the sense that the power of computational infrastructure
that enabled these technologies has already altered the way in which people
interact. For example, along with the salutary “democratization” of funding
start-ups, pre-functional crypto asset sales carry the risk of
“pump-and-dump” schemes as well as simple fraud.97 More generally,
while pseudonymity is blockchain’s strength through the creation of
self-sovereign identity as a state-based alternative to the internet, it also creates “extreme[] difficult[y]” in identifying and apprehending bad actors.98
This is precisely why regulators are needed. This Comment does not
claim that blockchain or ICOs are an unalloyed good or a libertarian ambrosia of some kind, or that courts or Congress should abdicate responsibility
to thoughtfully protect investors. Ultimately, it is still an open question
whether blockchain’s widespread adoption will result in “consolidat[ion]”
much as Web1 and Web2 did, becoming nothing more than another centralized network.99 But what is suggested here is that the current open-ended
approach by all regulatory agencies, particularly the SEC, should be carefully reviewed by courts considering the entirety of the complex system and
the need for regulatory consistency. The goal of a regulator, of course, “is
actually not to [merely] regulate. It is to achieve societal objectives.”100
The SEC’s mission, for example, explicitly provides that in addition to market goals, is to “protect investors.”101 Crypto assets—like all other technologies—have indeed experienced a period of rampant speculation and risky
behavior through unscrupulous crypto asset “offerings,”102 often to the detriment of unsophisticated investors. Furthermore, there is widespread acknowledgment that bad actors do exist in the crypto space and create
95. Id.
96. Id. at 170–71 (referencing a Mark Twain quote) (“A railroad is like a lie—you have
to keep building it to make it stand.”).
97. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 188.
98. Nate Crosser, Article, Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 67 Kan. L. Rev. 379, 388 (2018).
99. Moxie Marlinspike, My First Impression of Web3, MOXIE.ORG: BLOG (Jan. 7, 2022),
https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html [https://perma.cc/BD4V-7MZ
U].
100. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 196 (emphasis added).
101. About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml [http
s://perma.cc/PX3T-AAKX].
102. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 326.
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“significant” social costs.103 But the mantle must be taken up by the U.S.
regulatory apparatus to answer the hard question: at what point should a
largely case-by-case analysis and regulation by enforcement be prohibited
in the light of countervailing concerns? This Comment suggests that the
Litigation provides a good vehicle to invite a consideration of these policy
issues and moreover, the role of the law to manage complexity by considering attractors at work in the U.S. economy.
B. Crypto Asset Classification & Regulation
Although at a theoretical level the U. S. regulatory apparatus is still
grappling with so-called first principles regarding the regulation of blockchain technology and ICOs,104 practically speaking, a real problem for many
businesses seeking to enter the blockchain space is the lack of clear jurisdiction. In a suggestively titled blog post, Professor Carol Goforth notes
that crypto assets are “Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, all
at the Same Time.”105 Indeed, the rise in prominence of crypto assets has
led to uncertainty about where they fit in the existing regulatory schema and
under whose jurisdiction they rest.106 For example, prior to the SEC’s assertion of jurisdiction on the basis that XRP is a security, Ripple entered a
binding agreement with the Justice Department detailing that XRP was in
fact a currency.107 This was substantial for three largely practical reasons.
First, the alleged violations included failure to validate identity of those using XRP as a currency, and failure to ensure that individuals were not blacklisted;108 together, these requirements constituted a substantial expense in
what was previously a nascent and largely unregulated business operation.
103. Id. at 321.
104. As background, ICOs have changed the playing field, irrevocably decentralizing
business capitalization. “One of the effects of the rise of the token network is that a Silicon
Valley presence is no longer required, or even beneficial, to raising investment capital or
generating a dedicated community.” BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
105. See Carol Goforth, US Law: Crypto is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, all at the Same Time, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk
/business-law-blog/blog/2018/12/us-law-crypto-money-property-commodity-and-securityall-same-time [https://perma.cc/J4RS-YFNY].
106. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 320 (naming the federal level agencies that
have stepped into the lacuna to regulate crypto assets: the IRS, the Commodities Futures
Trading Commissions (CFTC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and
of course, the SEC).
107. Office of Public Affairs, Ripple Labs Inc. Resolves Criminal Investigation, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 5, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ripple-labs-inc-resolves-cri
minal-investigation [https://perma.cc/7LUN-JFRH].
108. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 191.
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Second, other companies with similar strategic goals perceived this regulatory threat as a “signal” that the United States was inhospitable to cryptocurrency.109 Third, and possibly most importantly, it demonstrated that
classifications by different agencies of the same crypto asset could overlap.
As a practical matter, the problem of jurisdiction over a crypto asset
will often come down to how it is classified. This raises several questions.
The first is simply that in the absence of a standardized definition of a
“crypto asset” or “token,” to what regulator is a business accountable to?110
If a regulator can arbitrarily claim jurisdiction over a single asset with their
preferred label of “currency” or “security” though the labels represent
things that are, in reality, very different from one another,111 how can regulatory exposure be mitigated? The answer the law has given turns on the
nature of the crypto asset. Broadly speaking, and subject to substantial
overlap—such as in XRP’s case—a crypto asset is, one or more of a (1)
cryptocurrency, (2) “tokenized” security, and/or a (3) “utility” token.112
Whatever the label, the object to be regulated is a crypto asset existing on a
blockchain, or, technically speaking, a cryptographically-secured ledger entry that is distributed across network nodes and subject to certain network
protocols.113 The distinction is primarily driven by the perceived purpose
of the crypto asset,114 although fierce debate rages over how to innovate
around the classifications and their implications.115

109. Id.
110. The source of this definitional discrepancy is twofold: partly because of the overlapping jurisdiction of different agencies and partly because of the fact-specific inquiry
which must be undertaken by regulators. See JURISDICTION WORKING GRP., AM. BAR. ASS’N,
DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS: FEDERAL & STATE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 2 (2020) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
111. Perhaps the most substantial difference is the fact that securities “confer [benefits
that] are largely unknown . . . because the product’s prospective earnings are unknown.”
Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies: Between a Currency and a Financial Product, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 118, 125 (2020). Currencies, on the other hand, provide “a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of
value.” Id. at 124.
112. Crosser, supra note 98, at 384. This discussion omits stablecoins, a fourth category
of digital asset. See also ABA REPORT, supra note 110, at 34.
113. See also SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
SYSTEM 4 (2020).
114. In 2018, SEC Chair Bill Hinman listed several elements that constituted “contractual
or technical ways to structure digital assets so they function more like a consumer item and
less like a security[,]” and noted that the SEC “would look to the economic substance of the
transaction[.]” Hinman, supra note 31.
115. See Shin, supra note 16; see also BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 16, at 14–15.
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Of the three, the easiest to understand are probably cryptocurrencies.
These are simply “peer-to-peer digital currency networks” that operate on
the blockchain116 and are “designed to act as an external currency.”117 Cryptocurrencies have been subject to overlapping jurisdiction of regulatory
agencies.118 But the rub comes in when distinguishing the other two types
of tokens. Utility tokens are created to help fund an initial coin offering and
create an internal, and often decentralized, economy of users within a blockchain. Their value “results from a mix of speculation in the asset and the
demand for their use in that network.”119 Ether, which is used to power
smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain, is an example. Another example would be a token that acts as “cryptographic ‘coupons’ redeemable for
mundane goods and services like bags of ground coffee or boxes of razor
blades.”120 Such crypto assets, if resold on secondary markets, would carry
value, but their value would mostly exist in their usage on the network. On
the other hand, security tokens are created as an investment and are tied
directly to the value of the company issuing the token.121 This would be a
genuine IPO conducted by blockchain where the only value of the token
would be the receipt of a return from the investment.122 And, of course,
securities laws would apply to such a token.
Within the context of securities, a further concern is that crypto assets
fall within the scope of both federal and state “blue sky” securities laws.123
Traditionally, and with some exceptions, a security that is sold intrastate
only is only subject to that state’s securities laws.124 It is when that security
falls into a category of federally regulated securities or is sold to investors
outside that state’s borders that the federal regulatory apparatus is triggered,
116. Crosser, supra note 98, at 388.
117. Id. at 389.
118. Id. at 390.
119. Shin, supra note 16.
120. BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 16, at 3–4.
121. Milko Trajcevski, A Deep Dive Into Tokenization, COINMARKETCAP: ALEXANDRIA,
https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/article/a-deep-dive-into-tokenization
[https://perma.cc/XS83-WVPM].
122. Crosser, supra note 98, at 391–92.
123. “[A]ll states can assert jurisdiction over securities transactions involving crypto-related subject matter because there is no blanket federal jurisdictional preemption in securities regulation.” Bryan K. Prosek & John R. Chadd, State Securities Regulators Are Increasing Actions Against Cryptocurrency Issuers and Exchanges, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.steptoe-johnson.com/content/state-securities-regulators-areincreasing-actions-against-cryptocurrency-issuers-and [https://perma.cc/N6D2-WA2C]
(emphasis added).
124. See SECURITIES PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04 (2021).
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and the federal government’s preemptive authority under the Supremacy
Clause is triggered.125 There is, therefore, a patchwork of rules regarding
crypto assets as securities in the United States.
The SEC was not the first regulator of crypto assets,126 but it has taken
an outsized role in blockchain and in ICOs in recent years. Its mission is to
“protect[] investors and maintain[] fair, orderly and efficient markets,”127
while maintaining “[p]rimary jurisdiction for the implementation, interpretation and enforcement of” securities laws such as the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1944.128 Speaking broadly, the “fundamental principle” of securities regulation is disclosure.129 As such, the basis
for SEC enforcement actions against companies making use of ICOs is often failure to register or disclose facts about the company of which the putative “security” represents a fraction of ownership.
The SEC’s authority is statutory, meaning a statutory basis must exist
for it to regulate. The broad drafting of the Securities Act of 1933 captures
a wide array of activity,130 and the SEC has elected to leverage its enforcement authority in the crypto asset space by using a “regulation via enforcement” approach in contrast to other comparable jurisdictions, such as the
UK.131 The SEC’s regulatory strategy deploys broad definitions132 and selective, predictable enforcement.133 The strength of such an approach is that
a regulator’s hands are not tied when wrongdoers utilize a novel approach
to facilitate otherwise sanctionable conduct;134 this is valuable in an
125. Id.
126. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 275 n.21.
127. About the SEC, supra note 101.
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a–bbbb (alternatively cited as Securities Act); § 78a. Enacted
following the market crash in 1929, “[t]he Securities Act and the Exchange Act and the rules
and regulations promulgated under these statutes by the SEC are the two primary [federal]
statutes pertaining to the offering and sale of securities, and the continuing information disclosure reporting [requirements of] operating companies.” SECURITIES PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 124, § 1.01.
129. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 182.
130. See Researching the Federal Securities Laws Through the SEC Website,
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec/r
esearching-federal-securities-laws-through-sec [https://perma.cc/YZN3-68XC].
131. Guseva, supra note 32, at 630, 638–40.
132. Id. at 666 (noting that the “inherently indeterminate definition of ‘investment contract’” was manageable because of the SEC’s predictable strategy of enforcement).
133. Id. at 635–37.
134. See M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Toward an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital
Assets, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 478 (2019) (“[T]he trouble with multi-factor analyses is that they create legal uncertainty—their virtue is flexibility to the regulatory.”).
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unstructured and rapidly evolving area of technology such as blockchain.
Yet consistency on the part of the regulator is required to avoid creating
unnecessary regulatory exposure that repulses investment; the regulator
must ensure that the market is aware in advance of violative conduct so as
to avoid it.
Because this approach to crypto assets requires a case-by-case analysis
by the SEC, there is great risk of uncertainty in the market and its regulation.135 For example, a company seeking to achieve widespread use of its
crypto asset, which actually has utility on its platform, seeks to sell the token
to fund the company’s operations. This strategy would require an intensive
analysis that would seem to cut both ways. On one hand, the crypto asset
has utility. On the other hand, it is sold by the company to fund the company’s operation. Aside from the decentralization which would immunize
the crypto asset from a “security” classification—and which seems to turn
partly on the spirit of the securities laws—questions such as whether the
company or a third party drives the value of the token136 or whether the
blockchain was “fully functioning or in early stages of development” at the
time of sale137 must be answered. Certainly, a “prefunctional token cannot
have utility[.]”138 In sum, this crypto asset may or may not be treated as a
pure “utility” token by the SEC, especially if it was convertible to fiat currency in secondary markets or otherwise.139 Such uncertainty surrounding
crypto assets has been amplified140 by the risk that if a crypto asset is found
to be a security, then the SEC will bring “the entire securities regulatory
scaffolding crashing down on it,” which is extraordinarily costly.141
Regulation by enforcement was not first seen in the Ripple litigation.142
Previous SEC enforcement actions against blockchain firms used a
135. Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 514 (2019).
136. Hinman, supra note 31.
137. Id. “Functional” and “prefunctional” refer to the fact that the blockchain network
to which the token is native may or may not be operational at the time of the token’s distribution. BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–5.
138. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 188.
139. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 320.
140. Hall, supra note 31.
141. Id.
142. In 2017, the SEC published an important report detailing its position on crypto assets
and signaling its position approach to the market. In the report summary, the SEC stated:
“This Report reiterates . . . [the] fundamental principles of the U.S. federal securities laws
and describes their applicability to a new paradigm—virtual organizations or capital raising
entities that use distributed ledger or blockchain technology to facilitate capital raising and/or
investment and the related offer and sale of securities . . . [The new paradigm] does not
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paradigm of “dynamic inconsistency” to regulate using strategic assurances,143 an open-door policy,144 no-action letters,145 and cooperation letters
in addition to enforcement. Troubling, however, is the fact that the Ripple
Litigation is the third recent case to demonstrate that “regardless of the defendants’ attempts to cooperate and the quality of [their] business projects”
the SEC did not attempt to meaningfully cooperate.146 In the face of criticism, the SEC argues its regulations have “clarity.”147 But many academics
and commentators—including some high-ranking former SEC personnel148—have deemed this approach to blockchain technology to be inadequate.149 Acknowledging the fraud and its risks that exist in the ICO space,
failure to consider overreach or the availability of alternatives to the SEC’s
current approach, such as simply amending the disclosure requirements to
make them less costly or pursuing another course of regulation, could be
remove conduct from the purview of the U.S. federal securities laws. . . . This Report also
serves to stress the obligation to comply with the registration provisions of the federal securities laws . . . .” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO 2 (2017) (emphasis added); see
also Guseva, supra note 32, at 657.
143. Guseva, supra note 32, at 662, 667–74.
144. Id. at 665–66.
145. Id. at 664.
146. Id. at 667, 658–61.
147. Isabelle Lee, Cryptocurrencies Should Not Be Viewed as Their Own Asset Class and
Should Be Evaluated Individually, an SEC Director Says, MKTS. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2021, 4:45
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/cryptocurrencies-asset-class-regulation-sec-director-securities-bitcoin-gensler-cftc-2021-11?amp [https://perma.cc/33UE-67FA].
148. Commissioner Hester Peirce, former commissioner Mary Jo White, and former
Commodity Futures Trading Commission chair Chris Giancarlo are outspoken critics of the
SEC’s approach. See Hester M. Peirce, Token Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-statement-toke
n-safe-harbor-proposal-2.0 [https://perma.cc/BR6A-LL73]; Jeff John Roberts, SEC is
“Dead Wrong”: Former Chair Mary Jo White Defends Ripple in Pivotal Crypto Case,
FORTUNE (Feb. 19, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/02/19/ripple-sec-lawsuit-ma
ry-jo-white-crypto-unlicensed-securities-xrp/ [https://perma.cc/B9YY-HKV2]; Leo Jakobson, “Crypto Dad” Chris Giancarlo: XRP is Not a Security, MODERN CONSENSUS (June 18,
2020), https://modernconsensus.com/cryptocurrencies/xrp/crypto-dad-chris-giancarlo-xrp-i
s-not-a-security/ [https://perma.cc/RG5S-Z9DE] [hereinafter Crypto Dad]. One SEC alumnus stated: “Outside the venture capital community, corporations, major investors and banks
are understandably skittish about risking serious sums of money on technologies their lawyers can’t assure them comply with law—even when a technology holds the potential to
improve the efficiency of managing vast amounts of data across countless industries, or the
potential for frictionless, inexpensive transfers of value over smartphones and other widespread consumer tools.” Hall, supra note 31.
149. See Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 301–10 (listing problems with SEC application of securities laws to crypto assets).
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costly.150 Aside from this, the time and money spent by taxpayers and defendants alike in litigation to determine whether a crypto asset distributed
by an ICO is a security is substantial.151 And the SEC has not limited itself
to ICOs: Coinbase, the largest U.S.-based cryptocurrency exchange, was
targeted by the SEC over its secondary-market lending products152 in spite
of claimed attempts to cooperate.153 Some argue that the SEC’s actions really amount to arbitrary decision making154 by a billion dollar regulatory
adversary, while other commentators go further, arguing that constitutional
due process rights may be violated.155 From a game theory perspective, this
latter litigation is relevant because it further signals that working with the
SEC to become compliant may no longer be an optimal strategy for firms
in the crypto space, a strategy that the SEC initially sought to cultivate156
and a key pillar of a successful regulation by enforcement strategy in a rapidly innovating market.
The theme that begins to emerge is that, as an immature technology,
crypto assets represent novel emergent responses to attractors in the U.S.
economy. It is understandable that the regulatory framework has focused
on a case-by-case analysis. And again, the mere fact that a framework is
open-ended is not necessarily problematic. But today, when innovation is
accelerating and “entrepreneurs and factfinders face a continual need for a
case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis in an open-ended interpretative
150. Id. at 304–307.
151. Cf. id. at 331 (“The most important benefit of these changes from the SEC’s perspective is that it would no longer need to spend resources litigating what is a security.”).
152. See Paul Grewal, The SEC Has Told Us It Wants to Sue Us Over Lend. We Don’t
Know Why, COINBASE BLOG (Sept. 7, 2021), https://blog.coinbase.com/the-sec-has-told-usit-wants-to-sue-us-over-lend-we-have-no-idea-why-a3a1b6507009
[https://perma.cc/2WKF-TPSY]; see also Adam Levy, Does the SEC Have a Case Against
Coinbase?, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 15, 2021, 8:16 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2021
/09/15/does-the-sec-have-a-case-against-coinbase/ [https://perma.cc/7QQU-M47C]; Zack
Guzman, Why the SEC Cracking Down on Coinbase Could Level the Crypto Playing Field,
YAHOO! FINANCE (Sept. 9, 2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-the-sec-cracking-do
wn-on-coinbase-could-level-the-crypto-playing-field-105128348.html
[https://perma.cc/F5CZ-62E6].
153. See Grewal, supra note 152.
154. See Guseva, supra note 32, at 656; see also Hester M. Peirce & Elad Roisman, In
the Matter of Coinschedule, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 14, 2021), https://www.sec.
gov/news/public-statement/peirce-roisman-coinschedule [https://perma.cc/5PVN-9MM3].
155. See, e.g., Roslyn Layton, SEC Assault on Ripple Provokes Wider Debate, FORBES
(June 30, 2021, 4:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2021/06/30/sec-assault-on-ripple-provokes-wider-debate/?sh=704b89c029e1 [https://perma.cc/4NA8-XH6Y]
[hereinafter SEC Assault on Ripple].
156. See Guseva, supra note 32, at 640–41.
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environment where there is no clear taxonomy of crypto assets as either
securities or non-securities,” it is time to re-examine regulatory practice.157
To be sure, a “shortage of regulatory certainty is . . . a feature of digital
assets.”158 There is lively debate on different approaches toward regulation
of blockchains assets, but in context, its growth as a response to the economic demand for law can be explained by the inadequacy of the current
regulatory response.159 Regulating to effectively discourage investment in
a tool that supplies the regulation needed is not an optimal response. Of
course, it does not help matters that the complexity of the economy and the
rapidly increasing technological innovation that blockchain represents
largely defies traditional regulation. An example not to follow is that of
some large economies who responded to the evidence of a demand for regulation by outright bans of currency iterations of crypto assets160 and a malign use of soft power.161 Government behavior like this suggests that there
are global, strategic reasons for a change in U.S. regulation of crypto assets.162 Whether the complexity of the U.S. economy has necessitated a
completely new approach to the regulatory apparatus of blockchain, or
merely demonstrates the desperate need for definitional clarity, may not
necessarily be a disjunctive proposition: both may be equally necessary.
In sum, in the span of one year, $8.7 trillion dollars have been pumped
into the economy by governments around the world.163 Despite a Keynesian
approach to spending that has recently enjoyed popularity with U.S.

157. Id. at 636.
158. Henderson & Raskin, supra note 134, at 445.
159. See, e.g., Nareg Essaghoolian, Initial Coin Offerings: Emerging Technology’s Fundraising Innovation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 294 (2019).
160. China has cracked down on all bitcoin mining in the country. This action was so
substantial that Bitcoin tumbled 6% following the announcement. See, e.g., Alun John et
al., China’s Top Regulators Ban Crypto Trading & Mining, Sending Bitcoin Tumbling,
REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2021, 1:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-centralbank-vows-crackdown-cryptocurrency-trading-2021-09-24/ [https://perma.cc/2X2N-7GT
Q].
161. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 123.
162. Id.
163. Jeanna Smialek, Inflation is Popping from Sydney to San Francisco. It May Be a
Good Sign, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/07/business/e
conomy/inflation-coronavirus-economy.html [https://perma.cc/B3RU-6APF] (“[G]overnment spending . . . has pumped some $8.7 trillion into the advanced Group of 20 markets
since January 2020[.]”).
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voters,164 there is strong evidence of an uneven recovery.165 In addition to
high unemployment, the erosion of spending power of inflation complicates
the already fragile view of government and big banks, as seen in the rush to
invest in crypto assets.166 Essentially, in the words of one technologist,
“[t]he current era is one in which trust in corporations and governments is
deeply shaken, while faith in technology as a force for change remains intact.”167 These are all elements of the complex system of the U.S. markets,
which, although
complexity theory . . . says we cannot predict . . . [it] [does not] advise[] us
to throw up our hands and take whatever comes. Rather, the concept of
tuning the coupled nature of the system’s structure suggests that we can
adjust the degree to which the system exhibits complexity and thus the ability to adapt.168

Regulation must address this reality by encouraging private innovation to
help counteract these effects, and it cannot do this with a shoehorned approach that fails to appreciate the totality of the system.
II. RIPPLE & CRYPTO ASSETS IN GENERAL
To help underscore the importance of blockchain, crypto assets, and
the Litigation, a somewhat conversational sketch of the use case of blockchain technology leveraged by Ripple is necessary. One leading academic
describes blockchain as a “backend revolution”;169 an apt description in the
sense that it implies the most significant obstacle to understanding it is the

164. PEW RSCH. CTR., BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CORONAVIRUS AID PACKAGE; JUST A
THIRD SAYS IT SPENDS TOO MUCH 4 (2021).
165. This is the case both globally and domestically. See Eswar Prasad, The Global
Economy’s Uneven Recovery, BROOKINGS (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/opinio
ns/the-global-economys-uneven-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/2LX6-PWPC]; Ronnie Walker,
US Daily: An Uneven Recovery, GOLDMAN SACHS (Aug. 27, 2021, 9:38 AM), https://www.
gspublishing.com/content/research/en/reports/2021/08/27/8a3f565c-ec9f-4b2c-bc6b-600f2
d01c658.html [https://perma.cc/SDW8-VSEZ].
166. This harkens to the financial woes that contributed to the creation of Bitcoin. See
WERBACH, supra note 8, at 35.
167. Id. at 30–31.
168. Ruhl, supra note 52, at 927–28.
169. SHERMIN VOSHMGIR, TOKEN ECONOMY: HOW BLOCKCHAINS AND SMART
CONTRACTS REVOLUTIONIZE THE ECONOMY 28 (2019) (emphasis added).
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fact that it is technical.170 But numerous explanations of the technology
exist,171 and this Comment does not seek to add to the number, purposely
eschewing much technical detail and jargon in favor of simply illustrating
(1) the importance of the underlying technology as used by Ripple Labs,
and (2) the regulatory dilemmas the technology raises for regulators, as expressed in the SEC’s approach.
A. Ripple’s Use of XRP
In the millions of international transactions that compose the world’s
financial markets, there are formerly-accepted points of failure that drive
cost and inefficiency. Those “fail points” may be location- or human-based;
they could be jurisdictional limitations or even the human susceptibility to
phishing or other system failures attributable to the parties themselves or
their agents.172 A crypto asset running on a permissioned network that is
trusted by all participants, regardless of sovereignty, could obviate the exposure from these risks and reduce potential loss. It is in this way that a
blockchain’s “logically centralized . . . but organizationally decentralized”
architecture could implement a scaled, decentralized payment rail where
one was not possible before.173
This is what Ripple does. Ripple is a payment company that deploys
an ecosystem of functions on a blockchain to facilitate efficient cross-border
payments by lowering transaction fees, shortening processing times, and removing the need for third-party intermediaries.174 This payment system
leverages a native token, XRP, to “replace the settlement layer between
170. See also Scott Rosenberg, Bitcoin Makes Even Smart People Feel Dumb, WIRED
(Aug. 9, 2017, 6:48 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bitcoin-makes-even-smart-peoplefeel-dumb/ [https://perma.cc/35DU-2EBV]; Jameson Lopp, Nobody Understands Bitcoin
(and That’s OK), CYPHERPUNK COGITATIONS (Mar. 11, 2017), https://blog.lopp.net/nobodyunderstands-bitcoin-and-that’s-ok/ [https://perma.cc/W7WN-LRVF]; Nik Custodio, Explain Bitcoin Like I’m Five, MEDIUM (Dec. 12, 2013), https://medium.com/free-codecamp/explain-bitcoin-like-im-five-73b4257ac833 [https://perma.cc/6SCD-KXP9] (offering
an amusing but apt analogy between the gift of a physical apple to a person and the same gift
of a digital apple; explaining how the unique problems raised by virtual currency are addressed by nodes, proof of work, and miners).
171. See, e.g., Crosser, supra note 98, at 388; JOSS COLCHESTER, BLOCKCHAIN: AN
OVERVIEW 6–11 (2018); SHAWN S. AMUIAL ET AL., THE BLOCKCHAIN: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL
& BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (2016); Time for a Ripple Test, supra note 25.
172. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 77–78. A “fail point” is any point in a system that
cannot fail without disrupting the entire operation of that system. Id. at 76. In other words,
it is necessary for the system to operate.
173. Id. at 7.
174. Giancarlo & Bahlke, supra note 40.
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major financial institutions.”175 Ripple also uses a network of exchange to
assist with liquidity and drive down intermediary cost between international
financial institutions.
B. Blockchain Background
As noted in other work, the crowdfunding movement started the financial world on a path of disintermediation.176 Since then, it has been proclaimed that blockchain-based systems and the crypto assets native to them
operate “without relying on trust,” or in other words, without relying on any
intermediary institutions.177 This is certainly an overstatement; instead,
blockchain strategically limits the need to trust by using a unique assemblage of techniques designed to reorient trust in the blockchain system, rather than any single person or institution.178
This reorientation was largely in response to the utter failure of American financial markets—and the army of underwriters, lawyers, brokers, investment bankers, auditors, regulators and consumers composing it—to understand the complexity of the risky financial instruments which ultimately
led to the loss of $9.8 trillion dollars in U.S. wealth, which is about $70,000
in lost lifetime income for every American.179 Despite paying fines, not
even the most reckless of those principals involved were prosecuted.180 In
other words, the impunity of Wall Street investment banks was perceived
as the Scylla to the Charybdis of the U.S. Government’s big bank
bailouts.181 The power of these “intermediaries” to make decisions about
the financials of regular people with little to no blowback left a bad taste in

175. David Rodeck & John Schmidt, Meet Ripple & XRP, Cryptocurrency For Banks,
FORBES (May 6, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/what-is-ripplexrp/ [https://perma.cc/3JEX-NVPP].
176. See Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding, 14 INNOVATION
POL’Y & ECON. 63, 63 (2014) (discussing the inflection point in finance that crowdfunding
precipitated).
177. NAKAMOTO, supra note 113, at 22.
178. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 116–17.
179. Renae Merle, A Guide to the Financial Crisis—10 Years Later, WASH. POST (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-guide-to-the-financialcrisis—10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html
[https://perma.cc/KM2X-AUC9].
180. SOLL, supra note 94, at 203.
181. See BULFINCH, supra note 4, at 227. This allusion refers to “proverbial . . . opposite
dangers which beset one’s course[]” in ancient Grecian myth. They are famously described
in Homer’s Odyssey.
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many people’s mouths.182 Blockchain was seen as a way to make a change
with new technology.
To describe what a blockchain is and how it works, a rudimentary comparison may be made with a referent network, such as the internet. While
the internet and the blockchain have some differences in connectivity and
deployment,183 at a conceptual level, the comparison attempts to highlight
the difference in intermediation, which is the hallmark of blockchain as a
tool for innovation. Generally, the internet works by connecting computers
called “clients” with computers called “servers” over an agreed-upon network architecture and data framework.184 The clients, which are the devices
by which users access the internet, seek data from servers by sending their
identifying information over the network to the servers which host the information the clients want access to. These servers are generally owned and
maintained by large corporations,185 and the protocols by which the servers
operate are not generally available to clients. But through these client-server relationships, the internet connects people across the world so
that they can interact with each other with little delay.
As an example, when a person wishes to buy something from an online
retailer (such as Amazon), that person accesses the retailer’s website from
their phone or computer (the client). The website itself, and all its contents—including all the items which sellers offer for sale—are stored on
servers owned or leased by the retailer.186 Importantly, because the retailer
controls this stored client data, there is an unavoidable element of trust on
the part of all users, whether they be buyers or sellers, in the way the online
retailer protects them.187 The retailer does this by collecting account information.188 Using this data, and by standing between buyers and sellers, the
online retailer acts as a trusted intermediary by facilitating legitimate purchases and by preventing bad actors from harming innocent users.

182. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 28.
183. See, e.g., Lucas Wiesflecker, Comparison of Blockchain Versus the Internet,
MEDIUM (Apr. 29, 2020), https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/comparison-of-blockchai
n-verus-the-internet-fad9cdc32487 [https://perma.cc/JXK2-GY36].
184. See, e.g., 35.100 Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), ISO, https://www.iso.org/ics/
35.100/x/ [https://perma.cc/5NAD-G2NX].
185. See Marshall Brain, How Web Servers Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, https://comput
er.howstuffworks.com/web-server4.htm [https://perma.cc/2CJ6-JTNT].
186. See id.
187. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 28.
188. Id.; see also VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 88 (showing that traditional “internet
platform providers . . . not only manage the identities of their users, but also control all of
their user-related data.”).
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The insight here is twofold. First, this idea of the “statelessness”189 of
the internet necessitates that the party with the server controls not only the
infrastructure used in the interaction, but also that it must store the identifying information of the client for them to interact. In other words, at scale,
transacting on the internet of today always requires an intermediary to maintain identifying data. In our example, it is the retailer itself. But it could be
anyone, including government actors.
Second, the need for an intermediary suggests trust is necessary. But
the current state of aggregated resources, such as computing power, is partially because of the way the internet evolved.190 There was not an intuitively viable way for users of a network to be identified and thus trust each
other that did not require consolidation of data by the holders of the servers.
And intermediation has a long and storied tradition in human history;191 as
such, the concept of data storage was not obviously discordant with practice. Although it seems obvious today that intermediation brings a host of
potential problems,192 only recently has an alternative become widely available.
C. Blockchain Framework
Blockchain is an information technology that requires a network of
computers that each run a particular software application, much like the internet. However, blockchains use a unique combination of cryptography
and distributed computing to allow each of the computers to maintain a
shared and secured source of data—think of an accounting ledger—that preserves the autonomy of that computer’s data.193 This autonomy largely obviates the need for intermediaries to manage interactions between parties on
the network.
While the problems briefly sketched above regarding intermediaries in
the legacy internet can be largely circumvented under this completely

189. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 40 (A “state layer” is “a universal data set across the
whole network . . . [i]t serves as a digital notary and a publicly verifiable timestamp.”) This
trust layer is missing on the internet; hence, the requirement that all clients’ information must
be stored on someone’s servers.
190. Id. at 29–32.
191. See Lindsay Martin, Ripple Effects: How In Re Ripple Labs Inc. Litigation Could
Signal the Beginning of the End of the Payment Platform, 19 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 4–5
(2021).
192. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 87–88.
193. COLCHESTER, supra note 171, at 3–4 (2018).
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peer-to-peer (P2P) system,194 how can parties trust that the system controls
dishonest behavior as effectively as an online retailer? The answer lies in
the fact that instead of a client-server network relationship, a blockchain
network is composed of a single distributed ledger, nodes, and unique protocols.195 In this framework, “nodes” are network participants, “protocols”
control the rules of participation in the network for the nodes,196 and the
“distributed ledger” is the single point of reference kept by (and for) all
nodes as the history of all network interaction on the blockchain.197
The distributed ledger198 is the record of all transactions on the blockchain between nodes, which are jointly and separately represented by a hash
function output.199 Although there are hundreds of conceivable iterations
of a blockchain, but a common function in all of them is that storage of data
in a sequence called “blocks” is required.200 Each block is composed of a
quantity of information established by the protocol—including the
timestamps of and hash pointers to previous blocks—that is itself encrypted
by a hashing function. Thus, cryptographic hashes “chain” the blocks together by chaining transactions together,201 as seen in Fig. 2.202

194. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 67 (“The ideal is that people and institutions who do
not know or trust each other, reside in different countries, are subject to different jurisdictions, and who have no legally binding agreement with each other, can now interact over the
Internet without the need for trusted third parties like banks, internet platforms, or other types
of clearing institutions.”).
195. See id. at 64–65.
196. Id. at 40.
197. Id. at 39.
198. Somewhat confusingly, the distributed ledger itself is also called the blockchain,
because it contains the records the so-called “chain” of transactions hashed together into
blocks. Id.
199. Id. at 74. A “hash” is a mathematical algorithm that takes any input whatever (i.e.,
of any variable length) and produces a fixed-length output that uniquely represents that input. See COLCHESTER, supra note 171, at 3. Critically, hash values have an “avalanche”
effect such that in a document of several hundred pages if even one comma is added, the
hash value of that document will be altogether different. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 74–
75. Thus, the only way to “recreate” an original file from the hash going backwards is to
attempt all possible inputs. Id. at 75.
200. COLCHESTER, supra note 171, at 6.
201. See id. at 3.
202. The hash value represented in the figure was calculated by inputting the transactions
as shown in the figure into an online SHA-256 calculator. SHA256 Online Hash Function,
ONLINE TOOLS, https://emn178.github.io/online-tools/sha256.html [https://perma.cc/FH3EX36T].
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Fig. 2

The output hash cannot be reversed without substantial cost in computing because each “block” includes within its hash the “headers” of all past
transactions. At the risk of oversimplification, this is how the blockchain
sustains trust in place of an intermediary: because to falsify a communication between nodes requires that a bad actor work backwards to find the
identifying hash faster than new blocks are added to the blockchain.203 This
takes an immense amount of computational power, which effectively acts
as “friction” in the system to disincentivize bad actors. Traditionally, whoever held access to all the data containing transactions made by a certain
client—an online retailer in our example above—would be able to track
double-spending and prevent a bad actor from making double payments.
Here, the idea is that the same problem of trust can be solved by transparency in the ledger enforced by computation.
Nodes are computers whose transactions form the basis of the data recorded in the blockchain. Each computer has a unique address on the
203. Cf. NAKAMOTO, supra note 113, at 6–7.
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blockchain network.204 Depending on the protocol, nodes may serve different roles,205 but in all cases they have several general purposes. First, nodes
interact with one another in whatever “transactions” the application software permits.206 Second, as established by the protocol’s consensus mechanism, nodes validate these transactions. Third, nodes record valid transactions on the ledger, updating each copy. The key insight here is that the
nodes operate in two modes: (1) client—initiating new transactions with
other nodes and (2) server—by maintaining the ledger of all transactions,
thus sharing benefits and responsibility of maintaining the system.
The protocol of the blockchain include the method of consensus, the
node types, and other critical matters for the network. “Consensus” refers
to how control of the network is effectively distributed by defining how
multiple nodes can reach agreement on the true state of the network.207 The
revolution of P2P systems, alongside blockchain systems, indicate that consensus is achieved through leveraging economic incentives along with cryptography.208 As stated above, these incentives often—but not always209—
use tokens. Importantly, while there are many protocols which may be deployed to implement blockchain,210 an essential scalability question is the
acceptable tradeoff between efficiency and trust; where fewer nodes validate, the trust of those validating nodes must increase.211 Thus, a blockchain
is a distributed, secure database.212 Unlike the traditional model used in
networks like the internet that require centrally owned servers, a blockchain-based model allows a network of computers to work together to
204. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 46.
205. Id. at 46–48 (noting that in the Bitcoin blockchain there are “full nodes,” “mining
nodes,” “mining pools,” and “light client” nodes).
206. This includes recording deeds, monitoring the chain of custody of a particular object,
transferring currency, or any situation where “a digital record and signature . . . could be
identified, validated, stored, and shared.” VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 62; see also
COLCHESTER, supra note 171, at 6.
207. See, e.g., VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 64.
208. Cryptography is the study of secure communications in the presence of third parties.
VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 68.
209. Stephanie Perez, Does a Blockchain Need a Token?, MEDIUM (Dec. 8, 2017), https://
medium.com/swlh/does-a-blockchain-need-a-token-66c894d566fb [https://perma.cc/8XLD
-5RFP].
210. While Bitcoin deploys a consensus mechanism called “Proof of Work,” Ripple deploys “The Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm.” AMUIAL ET AL., supra note 171, § 3:5
(2016). The purpose of these protocols is basically the same: to ensure trustworthiness of
the network and to ensure that the tradeoffs in between centralization and efficiency are in
within acceptable parameters according to the use case of the network. See id. § 1:2.
211. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 74–76.
212. See COLCHESTER, supra note 171, at 6.
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securely record data within a shared, open database. In this sense, every
computer operates as both a server and a client.213
D. Ripple’s Payment System
Ripple—formerly Ripple Labs—has created a payment system that is
a combination of a digital currency and a payments protocol.214 The cornerstone of this solution is RippleNet, which is a way for individuals and
financial institutions to transact using a worldwide network that leverages
the shared trust of a blockchain.215 XRP is Ripple’s native token that functions as a form of “on-demand liquidity” (ODL) that eliminates the need for
pre-funding and allows “money [to] move[] like information” between any
two parties anywhere in the world, so long as they are connected to RippleNet.216 Like in any market, when two people do not trust each other, yet
desire to do business, a necessary step has historically been to include an
intermediary to verify, settle, and disperse money. And, again, this works
to the detriment of speed, efficiency, and cost in the system.217 Crypto assets, like XRP, solve the challenge of needing some way to record electronic
money transfers so that people cannot simply make transactions up and create cash for themselves:
Normally, that central place is the Federal Reserve Bank—which records
and processes every credit card transaction. Cryptocurrencies eliminate that
regulatory intermediary by providing a decentralized, computerized
“ledger,” allowing for direct transfers between buyers and sellers with no
regulatory intermediaries.218

An example of the current money transfer system is helpful to illustrate
what Ripple has done. Assume users x1 and x2 are individuals in Country
X, and that x1 wishes to transfer money to x2. Assume further x1 and x2
hold their money in different banks: x1’s bank is Alpha Bank and x2’s bank
is Beta Bank. Like all banks, Alpha and Beta both maintain a ledger of

213. See id.
214. See RippleNet, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/ripplenet [https://perma.cc/ENK7-4BRQ].
215. Id.
216. Our Story, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/company/# [https://perma.cc/T9HM-LPCK].
217. What is Ripple?, supra note 21; see also Marcel T. Rosner & Andrew Kang, Note,
Understanding and Regulating Twenty-First Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case
Study, 114 MICH. L. REV. 649, 654 (2016) (noting that interbank transfers in the same country
take “one to two days to settle”).
218. Cecere, supra note 38.
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transactions of all their customers. When x1 orders Alpha to send money
to x2 at Beta, the two ledgers they maintain must be settled:219 x1’s account
at Alpha must be debited and x2’s account at Beta must be credited.
This is where a trusted intermediary—the Federal Reserve—comes in.
The Federal Reserve maintains deposit accounts for banks like Alpha and
Beta.220 Thus, Alpha orders the Federal Reserve to debit its deposit account
and credit Beta’s deposit account in the amount of x1’s transfer to x2. The
transaction is complete, and Alpha and Beta update their ledgers, with the
Federal Reserve’s deposit balance acting as a source of truth. So much for
domestic money transactions. But across international borders, the fundamental issue is that “there is no single global-payments rail[;]”221 there is no
international “Federal Reserve” equivalent. Internationally, the traditional
solution was correspondent banking222 and SWIFT.223 These legacy solutions operate according to principles of pre-funding and coordination
through messaging.224 But, importantly, they are still subject to intermediation and, worse yet, increased fees.225
Ripple changes the domestic and international payments paradigm
through blockchain technology by changing settlement, originally requiring
an intermediary such as the Federal Reserve, by deploying a distributed
ledger with its native cryptocurrency, XRP. Every node on the network can
view the ledger, and through the protocol of the network, certain nodes validate each transaction.226 Like any blockchain, the viability turns on the
219. A settlement is the adjustment of deposit balances between banks. Rosner & Kang,
supra note 217, at 653. Any deposit into a bank account is a financial asset for the depositor
“because it reflects the depositor’s claim on the bank that the depositor can redeem from the
bank.” Id. at 652.
220. Id. at 654–55.
221. Id. at 657.
222. Correspondent banking is “a contractual arrangement under which a bank in one
jurisdiction (a correspondent) holds deposits, denominated in its native currency, but owned
by a bank in an-other jurisdiction (a respondent).” Rosner & Kang, supra note 217, at 656.
223. SWIFT is a “centralised [sic] pre-Internet correspondent banking messaging network.” Antony Lewis, Ripple Explained: Medieval Banking with a Digital Twist, CoinDesk
(Sept. 11, 2021 6:45 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2014/05/11/ripple-explained
-medieval-banking-with-a-digital-twist/ [https://perma.cc/SD5H-4KH4].
224. See id.; Rosner & Kang, supra note 217, at 656–67.
225. Banks that do not have a correspondent relationship must chain up with other banks
in order to reach a bank with the necessary relationship. This process increases cost because
the banks without relationships must pay broker’s fees in addition to absorbing the costs of
international risk. Rosner & Kang, supra note 217, at 656–57.
226. As suggested above, there are numerous distinct blockchain protocols. For example,
there are various methods of mining and various methods used to validate transactions on
the system. See Rosner & Kang, supra note 217, at 658.
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protocol’s mitigation of the risks of trust disintermediation.227 Ripple’s network does not use mining; it is “pre-mined” and essentially, most XRP is in
escrow and is sold at preprogrammed times. Today, Ripple itself owns approximately six percent of all XRP.228
Ripple has two methods of facilitating international payments. First,
it can match users through the chain of trust (formerly called “xCurrent”).
Second, it can use XRP as a go-between (formerly called “xRapid”). A
simple example of how the latter operates in an intercountry transaction
works is as follows. Assume now that x1 and x2 are both participants on
Ripple’s network, which is composed of 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + . . . + 𝑥𝑛 people. Assume further that x1 wishes to send x2 an arbitrary amount of currency X. Now x1, using Ripple’s network, combines his unique network
identifier with x2’s address, along with the amount of currency, X, he
wishes to send. This transaction is hashed, and then via the Ripple Protocol
Consensus Algorithm,229 it is sent to an agreed-upon quantum of the n nodes
who must validate the transaction.230 When that quantum of nodes validates
the transaction, it is added to the blockchain using cryptography that is functionally similar to the simplified SHA-256 one demonstrated in Fig. 2.
False transactions—which means falsified ledger entries, whatever interaction between nodes that they contain—are prevented from accumulating in
the system. Thus, parties on the blockchain can rely on the system’s protocols, rather than on a central server framework, to prevent fraud. The system is trusted by both parties, rather than an intermediary holder of each
party’s data.
Now, when x1 wishes to send money to y1, who lives in country Y and
which uses currency Y, the issue of currency exchange arises. There are
two solutions: first, Ripple obviates the need for “chaining” settlement institutions together by using a system of “market makers.” Fig. 3 illustrates
the way in which “market makers” in the RippleNet system fulfill the
227. See id. at 658–59. Ripple distributes XRP through periodic sales; in this sense, it is
pre-mined. See Rodeck & Schmidt, supra note 175; Meet Ripple & XRP, Cryptocurrency
For Banks, Forbes (May 6, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/what
-is-ripple-xrp/ [https://perma.cc/3JEX-NVPP].
228. Rodeck & Schmidt, supra note 175. It is important to distinguish ownership from
control. Ripple has, in escrow, approximately 48% of the 100 billion XRP tokens created at
the inception of the blockchain. The uniqueness of the classification can be clearly seen:
Ripple does not release XRP without following a programmed protocol. Id.
229. AMUIAL ET AL., supra note 171, at § 3:5.
230. Validation refers to the process of nodes verifying the hashed identifiers of the parties to the transaction. VOSHMGIR, supra note 169, at 46–49. And, as a reward for validating,
a native token (or portion thereof) is issued to the nodes that validate. Id. However, Ripple
does not distribute tokens in this way. Rodeck & Schmidt, supra note 175.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss2/5

38

Smith-Bishop: A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: <em>SEC v. Ripple Labs</em> as an Inf

2022]

A RIPPLE-TURNED-TIDAL WAVE

373

function of trust. In essence, the system turns on whether any market maker
in the system has both the payer’s and the payee’s currencies on hand. Using an algorithm that only matches the lowest “bidding” market maker with
the two transacting parties, the system forces market makers to compete for
the lowest spread.

Alternatively, XRP is a “go-to between two different fiat types, [such
that] RippleNet’s [on demand liquidity] can facilitate transactions with each
side sending and receiving their native currency.”231 The result is that when
no chain of trust exists between two institutions, within three seconds the
sending-gateway’s currency is converted to XRP and then the XRP is converted again to the receiving-gateway’s currency.232 The viability of such a
system is borne out by the fact that Ripple’s XRP is the eighth-largest crypto
asset in the world.233 Indeed, N.Y.U. Professor David Yermack suggests
there is “desperate need” in the market for technology to “reduce the cost
of financial intermediation, probably by orders of magnitude.”234 Another
scholar further argues that the change itself must be “fundamental” and

231. What is Ripple?, supra note 21.
232. Free Working Capital with On-Demand Liquidity, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/ripple
net/on-demand-liquidity/ [https://perma.cc/S33Z-BGST].
233. All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 28.
234. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 114.
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structural to achieve the necessary change in the economics of financial services, such as through tokenization.235 This is exactly what Ripple had
done: by operating through trust, with currency as a backstop, the Ripple
approach is estimated to save $15–20 billion per year in settlement costs.236
In February of 2021, citing the Ripple Litigation, Ripple suffered cancellations from large users, including MoneyGram, which suspended its use of
the Ripple’s ODL.237 While other writers have predicted that the fate of the
platform may turn on the result of the Litigation, the fact is that today, Ripple’s “XRP-powered . . . ODL transactions are up 25 times” over 2020 Q3,
before the Litigation was commenced.238
E. Implications of Blockchain
Ripple’s use case is one of hundreds of possible ways in which the
blockchain’s growth is revolutionizing the economy.239 Indeed, the P2P interaction that it promises is considered part of the fourth industrial revolution240 and a critical part of Web3. A change of this magnitude requires
infrastructure certainly, but it also requires answers to important fundamental questions about who should be making decisions and how.241 The illustration of the struggle in Man Controlling Trade is suggestive.
Since 2017, when smart contracts242 were added to the ledgers on
blockchain systems, the potential for entire decentralized businesses
235. Id. at 115.
236. Rosner & Kang, supra note 217, at 662.
237. See, e.g., Jakobson, supra note 42.
238. Michael Lavere, Ripple CEO Says 2021 Was His Firm’s Strongest Year Despite
SEC Lawsuit, CRYPTOGLOBE (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2021/12/
ripple-ceo-says-2021-was-his-firms-strongest-year-despite-sec-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/5
A7S-98GY].
239. By 2023, blockchain is expected to play a critical role in managing and tracking the
movement of $2 trillion in goods and services annually. See Blockchain Technology: What’s
Ahead?, GARTNER, https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/insights/blockchai
n [https://perma.cc/7VX9-PVRK].
240. Cf. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fou
rth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ [https://perma.cc/VR2R-WA
K4] (describing the current digital revolution that is occurring at an exponential pace) (“[The
Fourth Revolution] is disrupting almost every industry in every country.”).
241. See generally Mulligan, supra note 17 (discussing multilateral regulation in coding
decisions—an important question regarding the wider social adoption of blockchains).
242. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 142, at 2 n.3 (“Computer scientist Nick Szabo
described a ‘smart contract’ as: a computerized transaction protocol that executes terms of a
contract.”)
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became possible. To the extent self-executing contracts can be written into
computer code, businesses as “a nexus of contracts” can be built entirely on
software running on the blockchain.243 Mundane functions (such as issuing
stocks and establishing shareholder permissions and voting rights) as well
as supporting functions (like accounting and payroll) can be entirely managed through this code.244 This is novel and emergent. As one commentor
put it, “[i]t has never before been arguable that a set of individuals could be
a legally cognizable group because an automated software process ‘acts’ as
their organ.”245 But that is what blockchain does when smart contracts are
deployed on the system.
Even more fundamentally, there are questions about applying the existing securities framework’s application to crypto assets. Even assuming
that most ICOs are securities, the first requirement is registration unless an
exemption applies.246 But whether an exemption applies is unclear in the
context of crypto assets. For example, in a distributed network, what is an
“issuer”? How about an “underwriter” or “dealer”? Given that computers
are not legal persons, this is a problem.247 As suggested above, the larger
theoretical challenges of regulating blockchain have been largely avoided
in the rush to protect purchasers of crypto assets. The way in which an
exterior source of law acts on a system requires answers to questions about
who and what constitutes the system subject to that law.248 Given the novelty of blockchain technology and the pressure to respond to fraud in time,
many agencies have stepped in before answering this question comprehensively.249 A full-blown regulatory scheme, while desirable, is not what is
needed today as a resolution to the Litigation. Before we turn to a new
approach sufficient to resolve the Litigation, the current approach will be
briefly discussed.

243. See WERBACH, supra note 8, at 110.
244. Id.
245. J.G. Allen, Bodies Without Organs: Law, Economics, and Decentralised Governance, 4 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL. 53, 63 (2020).
246. See 15 U.S.C § 77e (alternatively cited as Securities Act § 5).
247. See Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 294–300.
248. These questions are essential because, in theory, blockchain operates on the principle of “[t]rust[ing] a system without necessarily trusting any of its components.” WERBACH,
supra note 8, at 3.
249. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 275 (noting involvement by the IRS, CFTC,
FinCEN, and SEC).
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III. THE SEC AND REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT
The SEC has been engaged with crypto asset regulation for years, beginning with both the DAO Report announcement it made to the market in
2017 and the subsequent enforcement actions undertaken against blockchain-based firms.250 In the context of ICOs, the current SEC Chairman,
Gary Gensler, has said that registration and disclosure operates to protect
investors from the “[w]ild [w]est” of fraud251 replete in speculative ICOs.
The history of how the SEC came to regulate distributed systems is instructive as to the claims of this Comment and requires brief explication.
A. SEC v. Howey
The genesis of the SEC’s authority to grasp Ripple’s XRP began in
1946 when the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision interpreting section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933252 (the Act): SEC v. Howey.253
Section 2(1) defines the term “security.”254 Howey and its progeny are still
good law to this day,255 and the application of its principles determines the
threshold question of whether a particular “investment contract” is, in fact,
a security, and therefore whether the registration provisions of section 5(a)
of the Act apply.256
The facts in Howey involved an agreement between W. J. Howey Co.
(Howey Co.) and certain investors, whereby investors paid both Howey Co.
and a service company for citrus land and the “cultivation . . . and marketing” of produce therefrom.257 The question before the Court was whether
the agreement, which included a “land sales contract, the warranty deed and
service contract taken together, constitute[d] an ‘investment contract’
within the meaning of section 2(1).”258 Refusing to allow the scheme to
evade the disclosure requirements of the Act, the Court announced a
250. See Cyber Enforcement Actions, supra note 74 (listing about 150 actions taken
against crypto asset companies); see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 142, at 2 n.3.
251. See Katanga Johnson, U.S. SEC Chair Gary Gensler Calls on Congress to Help Rein
in Crypto “Wild West,” REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-se
c-chair-gensler-calls-congress-help-rein-crypto-wild-west-2021-08-03/
[https://perma.cc/6KL2-57XT].
252. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–bbbb (alternatively cited as Securities Act).
253. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
254. § 77b(a)(1) (alternatively cited as Securities Act § 2(1)).
255. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (upholding the Howey test).
256. Henning, supra note 8, at 60.
257. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
258. Id. at 297.
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two-factor test to determine whether the arrangement at issue was an investment contract: (1) “whether the scheme involves an investment of money in
a common enterprise[,]” and (2) “whether the profits of such investment
came solely from the efforts of others.”259 The Court found that the first
factor was satisfied because the “opportunity to contribute money and to
share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly
owned by respondents” was an investment contract.260 The Court also determined the second factor was satisfied because investors were drawn to
the scheme “solely by the prospects of a return on their investment.” These
findings lead the Court to conclude that Howey Co. offered a security subject to registration requirements.261
Howey has been applied to different schemes and has been expanded.
For example, the first prong of the test has been interpreted to include investments that “[o]ffer[] a contractual entitlement to a fixed, rather than variable, return” as an investment contract.262 Today, it does not matter what
form an investment takes.263 Additionally, the word “money” in Howey is
not strictly limited: other assets may be within the scope of the term.264 Finally, courts have created various tests to determine what a “common enterprise” is265 with the upshot that it is plausible for even decentralized cryptocurrencies to satisfy this prong.
The second prong of the test—requiring that profits must “[c]ome
solely from the efforts of others”—has also been judicially modified such
that “solely” does not retain its ordinary meaning;266 rather, it means “[t]hat
the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”267 Terms like “significant” and causal relationships
defined by “effects” are subsistence not for certainty, but rather for litigation; and as such, unless disputes are settled, lengthy judicial explication on
the merits is required.

259. Henning, supra note 8, at 61.
260. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
261. Id. at 300–01.
262. Henning, supra note 8, at 61–62.
263. Id. at 62.
264. Id.
265. A distinction exists between “horizontal commonality” and “vertical commonality.”
The distinction turns on whether the court focuses on the relationship between the promotor
and investor, or among the investors themselves. Id. at 62–67 (explaining this distinction
and listing cases).
266. Id. at 68.
267. Id.
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Today, what is referred to as the Howey test is the proposition that an
investment contract is a security if (1) “there is an investment of money (or
something else of value)[,]” (2) “in a common enterprise[,]” (3) “where the
purchase expects to receive profits[,] and” (4) “the expectations of profits is
from the essential entrepreneurial efforts of others.”268 This threshold question is “neither simple nor straightforward” and until 2017, no SEC guidance on crypto assets’ place in this schema was forthcoming.269
B. Considerations When Applying Howey
Fifty years on from Howey and one financial crisis later, the SEC provided an announcement of its position on crypto assets: the DAO Report
(the Report). The DAO was a crowdfunding platform that was formed on
the Ethereum blockchain that allowed holders of utility tokens purchased
with fiat money to vote on crypto projects.270 The SEC’s position was that
the sale of the utility tokens from April to May of 2016 may have been an
unregistered securities offering, and possibly a violation of the Securities
Act of 1933.271 What is important about the SEC’s conclusion that the tokens issued by the DAO were “investment contracts” under Howey272 is that
it partly set a precedent for dealing with ICOs, but also that the Report contained the SEC’s reasoning that “the essential managerial efforts” element
of the test was met.273 Essentially, it was “the combination of the important
role of the curators and the practical barriers to effective communication
and concentration of control” amongst the token holders that compelled the
SEC’s conclusion.274 The DAO Report put the U.S. market on notice of the
SEC’s position that tokens could in fact be securities, and thus subject to
the SEC’s jurisdiction, but it did so without any enforcement action, since
the DAO was already nonfunctional at the time of the Report.
Beginning with the DAO Report, through the first quarter of 2019, the
SEC’s regulatory position on crypto was hopeful.275 During this period, key
SEC personnel issued statements regarding their views on the scope of their
268. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 278.
269. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 278–80.
270. Id. at 280–81.
271. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 142, at 1. Ultimately, the SEC decided not to
pursue enforcement. Id.
272. Id. at 11–15.
273. Id. at 12–13.
274. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 283.
275. The SEC’s stance has been characterized as treating everything as a security except
for the two most popular and most decentralized crypto-assets in the world—Bitcoin and
Ether. Id. at 284–85.
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jurisdiction with respect to crypto assets,276 effectively communicating to
the market that leniency would be shown in response to cooperation.277 This
period culminated in April of 2019, where in response to mounting requests
by the crypto asset community, the SEC issued an expansive and complex
framework to determine whether a particular crypto asset was or was not a
security.278 Composed of various characteristics that the SEC considers in
classifying an investment contract as a security under Howey,279 the crypto
market’s reception has been mixed.280 Some suggest that because it was
issued close in time to a no-action letter applying it, that it was helpful in
indicating “how the SEC might approach” classification of digital assets.281
Oppositely, others point to the complexity and flatly state that the only certainty it provides is that of uncertainty.282 The SEC structured its approach
in an attempt to deter the “clever and dishonest” by ensuring that securities
camouflaged with “different appellatives” would not wreak havoc on consumers.283 This effectively changed the trajectory of the system towards the
“regulation” attractor, while also exposing it to potential domination by the
“innovation” attractor.
To the extent that a hope of clarity and predictability was stymied by
the SEC framework, companies have increasingly scrutinized the SEC’s
subsequent litigation to “counteract[] the indeterminacy of the functional
Howey test.”284 Recent litigation, however, has resulted in a less than clear
276. Id. at 284–87.
277. Muchnee, a blockchain-based company, cooperated with the SEC and refunded
money to purchasers of its utility token after the SEC contacted the company. See Guseva,
supra note 32, at 659–60.
278. Bill Hinman & Valerie Szczepanik, Statement on “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets,” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.se
c.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/5YQN-Z7HN].
279. Id.
280. Jonathan A. Ingram, Response of the Division of Corporation Finance Re: Turnkey
Jet, Inc., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/cor
pfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm [https://perma.cc/8U4F-Q2G2].
281. ALEXANDER R. MCCLEAN & MICHELLE L. BOUTON, HARTER SECREST & EMORY
LLP, SEC RELEASES FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF WHETHER DIGITAL ASSETS ARE
REGULATED AS SECURITIES AND ISSUES A NO-ACTION LETTER APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
(2019).
282. FinHUB’s Framework for Analyzing Digital Assets: The Only Certainty It Provides
Is Uncertainty, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/cryp
to-law-corner/finhubs-framework-for-analyzing-digital-assets-the-only-certainty-it-provides-is-uncertainty.html [https://perma.cc/JC63-FQNZ].
283. Guseva, supra note 32, at 637 n.54, 638.
284. Id. at 674.
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picture of the SEC’s strategy. After covering much ground, this Comment
turns now to two instructive examples of ICOs litigated in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in the years preceding
the Ripple Litigation.
C. Kik & Telegram—A Framework Demonstration
Two months after the SEC framework was issued, the SEC sued a Canadian company called Kik Interactive, Inc. (Kik), for, among other things,
conducting an unregistered securities offering in violation of the Act
through the sale of its token, Kin, in 2017.285 Of the two sales conducted—
a private sale of $50 million to accredited investors and, a day later, a public
sale of $49.2 million286—both were conducted to fund a nascent network
running on the established Ethereum blockchain for the company’s messenger app.287 There is some question as to whether Kik was aware of the DAO
Report and the SEC’s position. However, the SEC alleged,288 and Kik affirmed,289 that it did not attempt to engage with the SEC prior to selling its
tokens, instead attempting to exempt itself from U.S. registration requirements. This case settled in October 2020290 for about five percent of the
offering proceeds.291 Furthermore, Kik was not enjoined from continuing
to operate its blockchain.292
Second, roughly parallel in time to its lawsuit against Kik, the SEC
filed charges against Telegram Group Inc. and another company called Ton
Issuer Inc. (collectively, Telegram) for violations of the Act293 by issuance
of its token (called Grams) which occurred in January of 2018, raising $1.7
billion.294 Telegram, unlike Kik, was helmed by “well-established developers” who attempted to create an entirely new blockchain to solve the

285. See Complaint at 7–8, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (No. 19-cv-05244). [hereinafter Kik Complaint].
286. Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 175–76.
287. Carol Goforth, SEC vs. Kik Interactive: A Status Update on the Kin Ecosystem and
Kin Tokens, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 24, 2021) https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-vs-kik-inte
ractive-a-status-update-on-the-kin-ecosystem-and-kin-tokens [https://perma.cc/R9FE-3GS7
] [hereinafter Kik Status Update].
288. See Kik Complaint, supra note 285, at 29.
289. Guseva, supra note 32, at 670 n.268.
290. Id. at 668.
291. Id. at 672.
292. Kik Status Update, supra note 287.
293. SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
294. Id.
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business problem of blockchain’s inability to handle high transaction volume.295 They structured the sale of Grams around the DAO Report’s guidance by exempting themselves from the registration requirements.296 Importantly, the DAO allegedly cooperated with the SEC.297 Nevertheless, in
settling with the SEC after being enjoined from selling Grams in the United
States, Telegram was ordered to pay a $1.2 billion disgorgement and an
$18.5 million penalty, in addition to being later barred from selling its token
worldwide.298 The future of Telegram remains uncertain.
In both cases—in an order for preliminary injunction against Telegram
and in an order for summary judgment against Kik—the district court applied the Howey test.299 The first prong of Howey was concededly satisfied
by both companies, and in both cases the court did not analyze that element.300 The “commonality” prong was satisfied through the establishment
of horizontal commonality, which is “commonality that involves the pooling of assets from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and risks
of the enterprise.”301 Kik was found to have “pooled proceeds . . . in an effort to create an infrastructure” to increase the value of Kin by depositing
all the funds raised by the initial private placement and the subsequent public sale into a single bank account to fund its network development operations.302
In Telegram, the court held that horizontal commonality was satisfied
both pre-and post-launch: the funds from the initial sale to accredited investors were used to finance development of blockchain and messenger programs, and once completed, “the fortunes of the Initial Purchasers . . . remain tied to each other[] . . . as well as to the fortunes of the TON

295. Guseva, supra note 32, at 668; Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 360.
296. Page Proof Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 1–2, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No.
20-1076-cv, 2020 WL 1502476 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2020).
297. See Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Emergency Application for
Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-cv-9439, 2019 WL
11553248 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2019). Telegram allegedly “modified its technology” to allay
the SEC’s concerns. Guseva, supra note 32, at 671.
298. Guseva, supra note 32, at 672.
299. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 367–79; Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 177–83.
300. See Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 368–69; see also Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at
177–78.
301. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 369 (quoting SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42,
49 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 178.
302. Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 179.
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Blockchain.”303 Thus, the court reasoned, the timing of the sales were immaterial, and the sales were analyzed together.304
For the third prong, the court found that the prime value of paying for
both Kin and Grams laid chiefly in the resale in the secondary markets.305
The court thus disregarded the claims advanced by both companies that the
tokens were instead “utility” tokens and intended for consumptive purposes.
Instead, in Telegram’s case, the discount offered in the initial sale, the
lockup period contained in the terms of purchase, the nature of the marketing materials, the fact that only venture capitalists accustomed to buying for
investment purposes were marketed to, and testimony of purchasers that together disproved the consumptive purposes argument.306 In Kik’s case, the
court simply noted that at the time of the sale, there was no functional blockchain for the tokens to be used on.307
The fourth and final prong—blended with the third in Kik’s case308—
was easily satisfied because the tokens purchased did not exist until after
the purchases. Representative of both cases, the Telegram court stated that
the “[p]urchasers were entirely reliant on Telegram’s efforts to develop,
launch, and provide ongoing support for the TON Blockchain and
Grams.”309
Some of the particular takeaways are clear enough. For example, in
both cases, the court focused its analysis on the third and fourth prongs of
Howey. Also, the court found pre-launch sales to be integrated and ultimately constitute the same offering. How these two decisions affect the
Ripple Litigation is unclear,310 but it is a safe bet that the Southern District
of New York will analyze Ripple’s sales of XRP to investors in the same
way. What is troubling, however, is the dissonance between the facts and
the resulting enforcement: in a project with nearly no widespread adoption
and little to no cooperation with the SEC, that agency decided to merely
fine Kik what amounted to five percent of the proceeds from its sale.311 In
303. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 369.
304. See Id.
305. Id. at 371–72; Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 179–80.
306. See Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 371–75.
307. Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 180.
308. The blended prongs were reflected in the Kik court’s statement that “none of th[e]
‘consumptive use’ [alleged by Kik] was available at the time of the distribution. It would
materialize only if the enterprise advertised by Kik turned out to be successful.” Id. Thus,
Kik’s action to develop the blockchain was necessary.
309. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d at 375.
310. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 293–94.
311. Guseva, supra note 32, at 672.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss2/5

48

Smith-Bishop: A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: <em>SEC v. Ripple Labs</em> as an Inf

2022]

A RIPPLE-TURNED-TIDAL WAVE

383

a much higher value project that attempted to comply with the SEC’s framework and to cooperate with the agency, the SEC’s demand amounted to a
seventy-three percent loss.312 The SEC thus has signaled that cooperation
is met with heavier fines.
IV. THE RIPPLE LITIGATION ITSELF
In 2012, Ripple—then known as Ripple Labs—completed its proprietary blockchain.313 After several rounds of angel investment beginning in
2013,314 the SEC alleged that Ripple had sold XRP in the amount of $1.38
billion to fund its operations, continuing through the present. 315 In its complaint, the SEC alleged that all such XRP sales were violations of the Act.316
Furthermore—and unlike in Kik or Telegram—the SEC also involved executives of the company in the complaint.317 Christian Larsen and Bradley
Garlinghouse are alleged to have been personally responsible for “unregistered sales” of XRP in the amount of $600 million.318 As of the date of
publication, the case has passed the motion to dismiss stage and is still in
discovery.319
There is good reason to believe that XRP will be considered a security
under current precedent. This is because XRP has many of the hallmarks
of other tokens that were ultimately deemed “securities” under Howey.320
The Crypto Rating Council (CRC), a group of crypto-related businesses,
including Coinbase, offers a rating system for crypto assets.321 The system
analyzes the likelihood that the crypto asset in question is a security using a
312. Id.
313. See Ripple Labs Complaint, supra note 19, at 9.
314. Rip Empson, Now Backed by Andreessen & More, OpenCoin Looks to Build a Better Bitcoin—and a Universal Payment Ecosystem, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 11, 2013, 10:42 AM)
https://techcrunch.com/2013/04/11/now-backed-by-andreessen-more-opencoin-looks-tobuild-a-better-bitcoin-and-a-universal-payment-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/6TAG-76LR].
315. Ripple Labs Complaint, supra note 19, at 1.
316. Id. at 3.
317. See id. at 4–5.
318. Id. at 2; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Ripple
and Two Executives with Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering (Dec.
22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-338 [https://perma.cc/5HAL-79A
P].
319. See generally Order at 1, No. 20-cv-10832, 2021 WL 1814771 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
2022) (denying defendants Garlinghouse and Larsen’s Motions to Dismiss).
320. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 191, at 18.
321. About Us, CRYPTO RATING COUNCIL, https://www.cryptoratingcouncil.com/#aboutus [https://perma.cc/Z9JV-6U63].
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one to five scale, with a five meaning the crypto asset is most likely to be a
security.322 The CRC has rated XRP as a four.323 In the CRC’s view, XRP
shares “many characteristics that are consistent with the Howey-test factors,” though true to the open-ended factor-balancing of the inquiry, the
CRC notes that a four “does not mean that four prongs of the Howey test
are met.”324 The CRC states that its methodology involves the “objective”
use of factors considered under Howey that include “the design of the digital
asset, facts, and circumstances of the asset’s issuance, governance features,
third-party contributions to the project, and use of the asset.”325 Lastly, to
the extent it matters, both Kik and Telegram were litigated in the same forum in which Ripple’s case is being litigated.
There are other approaches to regulation that are at least as well-informed as to the facts and the social impacts of blockchain technology, for
good and for ill, as the current approach. Professor Werbach offers a summary of a regulatory approach that avoids the difficult “decentralization”
rationale discussed above, yet includes the explicit and nonexplicit Howey
considerations of ICOs, such as whether users or investors were intended,
and whether the crypto asset was functional or pre-functional at the time of
the offering.326 Werbach’s approach consists of three questions that a regulator should ask before a regulatory act should be taken:327 (1) “[w]as the
system created for a legitimate purpose?”;328 (2) “[is] there [an] alternative
means to achieve public policy goals?”;329 and (3) “[w]hat are the costs and
benefits of regulatory action?”330
Considering these questions, the legally correct answer as to whether
XRP should be considered a security may be different than what a superficial analysis may suggest. First, as has been urged throughout this Comment, RippleNet was created for a legitimate purpose: facilitating international payments.
Second, the alternative approach—less onerous

322. Frequently Asked Questions, CRYPTO RATING COUNCIL, https://www.cryptoratingcouncil.com/faq [https://perma.cc/RE2S-U8RZ] (in response to the question “What Does
the Rating Mean?”).
323. CRC Securities Framework Asset Ratings, CRYPTO RATING COUNCIL, https://w
ww.cryptoratingcouncil.com/asset-ratings [https://perma.cc/Z9JV-6U63].
324. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 322 (in response to “What Does the Rating
Mean?”).
325. Id. (in response to “What is the Council’s Rating Framework?”)
326. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 187–88.
327. Id. at 194.
328. Id. at 195.
329. Id. at 196.
330. Id. at 198.
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registration and disclosure requirements, or foregoing enforcement altogether—should be a live option. There is legitimate concern about the
cost-benefit ratio of traditional securities disclosures in context of crypto
assets.331 However, the SEC has taken a hardline position that disclosures
are beneficial, and that in Ripple’s case, all unregistered XRP sales “deprived potential purchasers of adequate disclosures about XRP and Ripple’s
business” as well as “other important long-standing protections.”332
As to Garlinghouse and Larsen, the SEC has argued that they were
“warned that XRP was unlikely to be considered ‘currency’” and that, therefore, they should have preemptively registered XRP because they were on
notice of their conduct being potentially violative.333 Strengthening the
SEC’s argument is the fact that during the litigation, ongoing sales of XRP
have occurred. But Garlinghouse and Larson point out that the bigger issue
here is that the DAO Report was only released in 2017. And, as stated
above, the SEC’s statements about Ether and Bitcoin were made shortly
thereafter. Therefore, neither Ripple, Garlinghouse, nor Larsen could have
had “fair notice” about the SEC’s position on crypto assets under a regulation by enforcement regime. This argument has produced legal fruit for
Ripple.334
In considering the costs of the regulatory action, the SEC’s delay has
been widely noted. One commentator stated that the SEC appears to be
saying that XRP “has been an unregistered security since 2013 . . . and the
SEC . . . [has] just [gotten] around to saying so on the last day of [former
Chairman Jay] Clayton’s tenure . . . .”335 Although reading the tea leaves is
risky, it has been suggested that this last-minute lawsuit may indicate a “rift”
between the five SEC commissioners in bringing action against Ripple.336
The implication is that not all five commissioners believed suing Ripple
would “avert looming investor harm” or that perhaps an action against Ripple created too substantial a risk to investors.337 Indeed, investors did lose
substantial sums after the lawsuit was announced. Holders of XRP were
not silent; in response to these holder’s concerns, the judge presiding over

331. See Hall, supra note 31.
332. Press Release, supra note 318.
333. Ripple Labs Complaint, supra note 19, at 10.
334. See Order at 1, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20-cv-10832, 2021 WL 1814771
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2022) (denying the SEC’s Motion to Strike Ripple’s affirmative defense
regarding fair notice).
335. The SEC Is Now on Trial, supra note 25.
336. Hall, supra note 31.
337. Id.
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the Litigation opened “thousands” of phone lines to listen to arguments.338
Furthermore, an unsuccessful intervenor motion was filed by 18,000 XRP
holders, the six largest of which were, for now, granted amici status.339 This
is clearly a cost to the perception of the SEC.
Moreover, since the DAO Report, the SEC’s position on crypto assets
has become much more pessimistic. Following Jay Clayton’s departure,
Gary Gensler became Chairman of the SEC in April of 2017.340 Despite
having taught at MIT on crypto assets and blockchain, and generally being
perceived as pro-crypto, Gensler has gone on record claiming that all ICOs
are unregistered securities offerings.341 Further, under his watch the SEC
increased its enforcement actions by seven percent in 2021,342 including an
action against Coinbase, as noted above. Gurbir Grewal took the helm of
enforcement on July 26, 2021, and the prediction that he would continue the
SEC’s regulation by enforcement approach has been disproven,343 raising
the issue of the lack of predictability foreshadowed in Kik and Telegram.
Recall that Ripple settled with the Department of Justice on the express term
that “Ripple Labs sold virtual currency known as ‘XRP’”344 whereas in its
complaint, the SEC asserted that “XRP is not ‘currency’ under the federal
securities laws.”345 Securities registration requirements are expensive
enough, laying aside the questionable efficacy for purchasers of blockchain
tokens on a mass scale, but to compound this problem with currency registration seems “redundan[t] and inefficien[t].”346
338. Roslyn Layton, The Crypto Uprising the SEC Didn’t See Coming, FORBES (Aug. 30,
2021, 11:24 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2021/08/30/the-crypto-uprising-the-sec-didnt-see-coming/?sh=45d7c513143e/ [https://perma.cc/HSN4-YEYW].
339. See SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20-cv-10832, 2021 WL 1814771 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
4, 2021) (order denying Motion to Intervene).
340. Christopher Conniff et al., What to Expect Under SEC Enforcement Director
Grewal, LAW360 (Jul. 30, 2021, 12:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1407259/wh
at-to-expect-under-new-sec-enforcement-director-grewal [https://perma.cc/U4KL-53R2].
341. See Kia Kokalitcheva, SEC Chair Gary Gensler Turns His Eyes on Crypto, AXIOS
(Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.axios.com/sec-chair-gary-gensler-crypto-e5d7d8af-c5d0-41769437-2d4b211a33a6.html [https://perma.cc/WQC4-WFP2].
342. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Results
for FY 2021 (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-238 [https://per
ma.cc/9UKE-4X3W].
343. Coniff et al., supra note 340.
344. Office of Public Affairs, supra note 107
345. Ripple Labs Complaint, supra note 19, at 60.
346. See, e.g., Roslyn Layton, Former Financial Regulator on SEC v. Ripple: Forget the
Fanfare. Focus on Evaluation, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2021, 10:12 AM) https://www.forbes.com/
sites/roslynlayton/2021/08/13/former-financial-regulator-on-sec-v-ripple-forget-the-fanfare-focus-on-evaluation/?sh=110e748962f0 [https://perma.cc/97T2-R7TV].
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While the reasons behind the SEC’s series of enforcement actions over
the past five years are less than clear, the impact of the Kik, Telegram, and
now Ripple litigation as precedent cannot be understated. In game theory
terms, these cases can be considered along the dimensions of (1) the purpose
of the ICO and the level of success thereof,347 (2) the timing of the litigation
and the companies’ level of cooperation with the SEC,348 and (3) the seriousness of the charges and penalties.349 In this light, Professor Guseva suggests a rational business owner should conclude that “the SEC ignored cooperation and did not show leniency in enforcement as a way to promote its
objective of supporting innovations.”350 The problem is that future innovators in the blockchain space will “observe . . . [and] update their beliefs[]
and choose their strategies consistently with the SEC’s choices (or their
probability).”351 While it is at least arguable that these actions may have
protected some investors, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have less
than clear guidance on regulatory exposure in the rapidly developing area.
Ultimately, barring congressional intervention, or unless the facts of
Ripple—particularly fair notice—hold sway, it is probable that the case will
end similarly to Kik and Telegram at the district court. As stated above,
courts have had no difficulty in combining the sales in those cases and finding horizontal commonality and expectation of profits. Many believe that
the court will have little difficulty implying the broad application of the
third and fourth prongs of Howey to Ripple.352 On the other hand, the court
has authority to consider the underlying policy behind the law and could
commit itself to following a textual interpretation informed by the policies
implicated, as professor Werbach has advocated for. Turning from the mechanical application of Howey, several alternatives will now be explored.

347. Guseva, supra note 32, at 668–70.
348. Id. at 670–72.
349. Id. at 672–73.
350. Id. at 674.
351. Id.
352. See Martin, supra note 191, at 14–18 (concluding that XRP will almost certainly be
a security under Howey). One interesting article applied the Howey test to Ripple and concluded that “the [district] court is going to determine the best way to prohibit what the SEC
believes is the sales of an unregistered security offering. As such, this case may not bring as
much regulatory clarity to the crypto industry as many initially thought. . . . We anticipate
Ripple will fight aggressively against the SEC, but may ultimately pay a fine.” Andrew Bull
& Tyler Harttraft, Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Law: SEC’s Heightened Enforcement
Against Digital Assets, 27 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 33 (2021).
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND OUTCOMES
The Litigation is an important point in the trajectory of blockchain innovation in the U.S. economy. Whatever merits regulation by enforcement
possesses, the facts demonstrate its potential for abuse, and this case should
provide an impetus to reconsider the way in which blockchain and ICOs are
regulated.353 Whatever happens, it must be remembered that “ill-considered
regulatory actions could push blockchain activity to other countries, send it
underground, and stop valuable innovation in its tracks.”354 This is particularly ill-advised given the new development of the metaverse and its trustless architecture that will require a vast increase in blockchain adoption.355
Establishing an environment amendable to regulation means equalizing the tradeoff of capital formation to harm through loss of stability.356
Suggestions along this line have been made,357 and one seemingly compelling solution that seems to meet crypto assets and blockchain on its terms is
the inclusion of certain agreed-upon blockchain protocols that when deployed could provide regulatory exemptions to the tokens on the system.358
While the above solutions and others cannot be ruled out as an emergent
result, the most direct outcomes of litigation that has passed the dismissal
stage359 are the subjects of this section, followed by a proposed legislative
amendment which would totally exempt Howey.

353. One prominent commentator noted that “[t]he demand for a Ripple Test is evolving
whether the SEC wins its case or not. The conversation has moved beyond the SEC, not
only because its credibility has been shaken by its startlingly bad arguments in the pre-trial
phase. There is a growing recognition that the treatment of XRP by the SEC has come to
symbolize the U.S. government’s fundamental misunderstanding of cryptocurrencies, decentralized ledgers and blockchain technology, and what they mean to the global economy.”
SEC Assault on Ripple, supra note 155.
354. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 11.
355. Raczynski, supra note 45; see also Yaёl Bizouati-Kennedy, Understanding the
Metaverse and How It Relates to Cryptocurrency, YAHOO! (Nov. 18, 2021, 2:22 PM), https://
www.yahoo.com/now/understanding-metaverse-relates-cryptocurrency-192229918.html
[https://perma.cc/75T2-USFK].
356. Henning, supra note 8, at 71.
357. See, e.g., Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 310–17 (collecting approaches and
sources); Jabotinsky, supra note 111.
358. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 315–16.
359. See, e.g., Martin Young, Ripple Granted Access to Binance’s Records in SEC Securities Case, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 5, 2021), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ripple-grantedaccess-to-binance-s-records-in-sec-securities-case [https://perma.cc/5KZE-UGQF].

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss2/5

54

Smith-Bishop: A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: <em>SEC v. Ripple Labs</em> as an Inf

2022]

A RIPPLE-TURNED-TIDAL WAVE

389

A. Cleaning Up Howey
The court could shape the Howey test itself. The court could restrict
Howey to only non-utility tokens. The entire purpose of Howey is to discover what digital currency offerings are in fact securities vis-à-vis the “investment contract” framework.360 In holding that the scheme by Howey Co.
was an investment contract, the Court did not rule on whether the oranges
themselves were a security.361 Instead, as discussed in Part II(A), the Court
looked to the circumstances surrounding the sale of the orange groves. The
distinction here is that the oranges themselves would be the subject of the
securities regulation, which when analogized to tokens would effectively
create discrete boundaries around certain crypto asset types and their sale.362
If feasible, this application would allow businesses and investors to know
beforehand whether a particular crypto asset—i.e., token—is a security, or
when “distribution and . . . sale of th[at] asset under certain circumstances”
requires security disclosures.363 If modeled according to a dynamical systems theory, this may create a countervailing “right” attractor in the system.
Businesses would operate under some certainty that their tokens will fall
under known regulatory strictures. Although this alone would not preempt
multiple regulators’ jurisdiction, it would at least allow strategic development to sidestep the SEC’s jurisdiction.
However, such a narrow construction of Howey would require a solid
judicial understanding of utility tokens and blockchain operation. Where
the difficulty lies is in identifying a pure utility token and separating the
token from the network. The SEC errs on the side of finding a security
rather than a fiat currency364—as it is currently entitled to do365—but of
course the court has the authority to apply precedent where, in its judgment,
the precedent controls. Indeed, the courts in Kik and in Telegram accepted
the SEC’s focus on the utility as a function of the underlying network. However, neither of those cases had the facts or the stakes of the Ripple Litigation. It may also be that the recent scholarship on crypto assets is

360. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946).
361. Id. at 300.
362. See Crosser, supra note 98, at 409.
363. Cf. Pimentel supra note 87.
364. See Pimentel supra note 87.
365. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (establishing a general policy of deference to administrative agencies, known as the Auer doctrine); Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) reh’g denied, 880 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (upholding the Auer
doctrine).
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persuasive,366 such as legislative enactments deeming utility tokens exempt
from security laws, to help the court make an informed decision about the
nature of the token under a narrow application of Howey.
The second approach the court could take would be to clarify the third
and fourth prongs of Howey. As stated in Part II(C), prongs (1) and (2) are
not often at issue. The greatest opportunity for clarity, then, rests here. One
proposal has largely mirrored the utility approach suggested above by focusing on “good faith, substantial steps towards completion of a project that
[the promotors of the project] believe will have use to some users of the
token beyond resale value or economic income.”367 The Article which proposed this test was cited by the district court in Telegram,368 though not for
this element of the test, but rather for support of the proposition that the
“essential efforts” of Telegram were still needed to complete the blockchain
under prong (4) of Howey.369 What is proposed here is that in determining
whether the token is a security, the court should scrutinize the relationship
for an agreement between the purchasers of the token and the business selling it for the completion of an underlying technology.370 In other words,
the court should ask whether “an explicit or implicit contract to build and
manage software [i.e., a blockchain, actually exists] such that if there were
a breach of that contract, the project would fail[.]”371 The concept attempts
to contour the commonsense difference in purchasing a share of ownership,
and purchasing a “utility” token designed for use on a new software. This
element is not particularly revolutionary, but it may make a difference in a
close inquiry like Ripple’s, where the blockchain was completed and operational early on.
A common law court’s “jurisprudential discipline of rule-making and
rule enforcement” is more critical than ever.372 The approaches discussed
above operate within the existing Howey framework and do not require any
immense leaps of the court, but the results would likely be impactful and
allow the facts of the case their appropriate effect in the context of the law’s
larger goals.
366. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
367. Henderson & Raskin supra note 134, at 488.
368. SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
369. Id. at 375–76.
370. Id. at 361–77.
371. Henderson & Raskin supra note 134, at 461.
372. WERBACH, supra note 8, at 11.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss2/5

56

Smith-Bishop: A Ripple-Turned-Tidal Wave: <em>SEC v. Ripple Labs</em> as an Inf

2022]

A RIPPLE-TURNED-TIDAL WAVE

391

B. Congressional Action
To borrow Dr. Pangloss’ quip from Voltaire’s Candide, the
“best-of-all-possible-worlds” solution would be congressional preemption.
There are at least two solutions which scholars have proffered: first, amending the underlying rule defining securities and creating a new class thereof,
subject to plenary SEC jurisdiction,373 and second, creating a safe harbor
within the investment contract framework, as proposed by Commissioner
Peirce.374
As proffered in detail by Professor Goforth, Congress could give the
SEC plenary authority over crypto assets.375 The primary justification offered for this approach is twofold. First, it is more realistic than expecting
the SEC to change its previous approach developed in Howey. This is a
practical consideration that has been borne out in Kik and Telegram, discussed in Part IV(C). Second, it would benefit the market by removing
Howey and the “uncertainty and complexity” of deeming crypto assets “securities” or not.376 It would also clarify jurisdictional concerns by limiting
jurisdiction over crypto assets based on an explicit definition and on use of
secondary markets.377 The road to this solution is suggested as a
four-step-process:
First, Congress should amend the definition of security in the federal securities laws to explicitly recognize crypto assets as a new class of security.
Second, Congress should give the SEC exclusive authority over this asset
class, although the CFTC would retain jurisdiction over derivatives of such
assets and the exchanges upon which such derivatives are traded. Third,
Congress should give the SEC preemptive authority in order to ensure that
conflicting state regulations will not overly complicate the regulatory response. Fourth, the SEC should be given explicit authority and direction to
create exemptions for this new class of security.378

373. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 316–21.
374. See Peirce, supra note 148 (“The safe harbor seeks to provide network developers
with a three-year grace period within which, under certain conditions, they can facilitate
participation in and the development of a functional or decentralized network, exempted
from the registration provisions of the federal securities laws.”).
375. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 318–19.
376. Id. at 320.
377. Id. at 321–25.
378. Id. at 318
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Importantly, the SEC’s institutional knowledge is utilized while avoiding the downside of potentially unclear, and therefore, oppressive regulation.379 This approach will also disarm the arguments made to the public
about the SEC as grasping and overreaching, claims aggressively made
since the Ripple and Coinbase lawsuits. Another suggestion is a “safe-harbor”380 that would conditionally shield a crypto asset from claims by the
SEC “presumably because market forces, rather than the efforts of any identifiable persons would dictate pricing.”381 This solution merits discussion
because it both benefits the market and it may be quickly adopted; however,
it is likely a short-term fix because it fails to address the underlying problems of delineating what a “security” is.
Of course, aside from the friction inherent in congressional action,
there is also substantial partisan deadlock. But, as discussed in Parts I, II,
and III, there is likely sufficient economic, political, and strategic incentive
for Congress to act. Being perceived as pro-crypto could have attractive
political benefits. For one thing, crypto assets are roughly analogous to the
internet and its benefits of democratization of information. Indeed, the
crypto asset lobby has, and is, engaging with Congress.382 Already, congressmen battle across the country to lure tech dollars to their state in the
wake of continued growth in computing power, predicted by Moore’s Law
and the advent of Web3.
C. Potential for Settlement in Ripple
Last, settlement and payment of a fine is likely. Obviously, in common
law systems, for precedential purposes, settlement after summary judgment
would be best. Needless to say, the result of litigation with the SEC is often
settlement—to be sure, both Kik and Telegram settled383—because for a
business, litigation is tantamount to a cost-benefit analysis of each motion
multiplied by its chance of success. The effect of the inclusion of allegations against the executives of Ripple and their failure to obtain dismissal
may be the cause of more aggressive litigation or it could bear fruit as an
incentive for additional cooperation in negotiation. Also, in looking to the

379. Id. at 324.
380. See Peirce, supra note 148.
381. Cinderella’s Slipper, supra note 39, at 316.
382. Rebecca Klar, Crypto Industry Seeks to Build Momentum After Losing Senate Fight,
THE HILL (Aug. 11, 2021, 5:39 PM), https://thehillcom.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/thehill.com/
policy/technology/567460-crypto-industry-seeks-to-build-momentum-after-losing-senatefight?amp [https://perma.cc/49D4-67D8].
383. Guseva, supra note 32, at 672.
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cumulative weight of public perception, the arguments made by Ripple in
conjunction with the fact that the SEC has been checked by the discovery
ordered against it384 may mean that it feels unusual pressure to end the lawsuit early. Perhaps sensing this, Ripple’s executives have expressed interest
in settlement conditioned on obtaining “clarity” from the SEC on XRP’s
status.385 Other commentators have suggested that no such thing is on the
horizon,386 and the settlement theory is belied by the fact that the SEC and
Ripple have been engaged in an escalated war of words in the media.387
Again, in game theory terms, society’s “lowest possible payoff” occurs
when no cooperation is forthcoming between the regulator or the private
actor against whom a regulatory action is brought.388 Ultimately, the import
of the parties’ external actions on settlement is not entirely clear given the
limited information on the substance of possible negotiations. However, so
long as there is the possibility of settlement, it cannot be ruled out as a likely
possibility.389
CONCLUSION
Today, like after World War II, the United States stands at a burgeoning of a new paradigm in the complexity of society. A likely component of
this complexity is blockchain technology, which has potential similar to the
internet in redefining how people interact at scale, democratizing fundraising and innovation, and solving previously intractable business and social
problems through its unique use of trust. As they have slowly begun, the
courts must think about the SEC’s regulation by enforcement strategy with
respect to the sale of crypto assets, which are integral to the operation of
many blockchain solutions. This Comment has observed the history of the
Ripple case, and argued both that the proper analytical framework for
384. See The SEC Is Now on Trial, supra note 25.
385. Daily Hodl Staff, Ripple CEO Brad Garlinghouse Says He’s Open to Settling Landmark XRP Case with SEC, DAILYHODL (Sept. 26, 2021), https://dailyhodl.com/2021/09/26/
ripple-ceo-brad-garlinghouse-says-hes-open-to-settling-landmark-xrp-case-with-sec/
[https://perma.cc/WZA4-P3HF].
386. E.g., Tanzeel Akhtar, Ripple, SEC Say Settlement Unlikely Before Trial Over Alleged Securities Violations, COINDESK (Feb. 16, 2021, 4:51 AM), https://www.coindesk.
com/ripple-sec-say-settlement-unlikely-before-trial-over-alleged-securities-violations
[https://perma.cc/BSC4-K633].
387. See Pimentel, supra note 87.
388. Guseva, supra note 32, at 652.
389. See Rick Steves, SEC v. Ripple: “Strange Things” Hint That Settlement Is in the
Works, FINANCE FEEDS (July 30, 2021, 7:36 AM), https://financefeeds.com/sec-v-ripple-stra
nge-things-hint-that-settlement-is-in-the-works/ [https://perma.cc/9NVW-UZJ8].
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considering blockchain innovation is complexity theory and that the facts
in the Ripple Litigation make it an apt illustration of complexity theory’s
key principles.
Given the effects of strange attractors, such as the pandemic and inflation on agents and institutions in the U.S. economy, it is difficult to predict
the trajectory of innovation. However, in the context of the Ripple Litigation, three results are likely. Aside from settlement, this Comment has suggested two solutions proffered by leading academics and scholars, including
curbing arbitrary classification and regulation by narrowing Howey to only
non-utility tokens, or by providing additional clarification to the most litigated “prongs” of the inquiry it commands. Otherwise, or perhaps consequently, this Comment suggests that congressional action that either secures
the SEC’s jurisdiction and defines what constitutes a security and who has
plenary power to regulate it, or that creates a short-term safe harbor for
crypto assets, would be a logical course.
These outcomes, while desirable, are a temporary panacea. Ideally,
the Ripple litigation will prove to be an opportunity taken by regulators to
consider innovations like blockchain as an emergent phenomenon that depends on trust. By doing this, regulators can hopefully avoid reductionist,
binary decisions about policy that fail to capture the full complexity of the
system and thus promote greater resilience in the U.S. economy against dangers foreseen and unforeseen. Under such an approach, consumers and innovators will both win. Faced with new forms of the challenges that have
existed throughout history, the U.S. government’s regulatory apparatus
must answer the call and use new methods made available by complexity
theory. At what cost it does this—and how quickly—will surely color the
remembrance of this era when future generations gaze upon Man Controlling Trade.
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